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INTRODUCTION
In December 2001, Enron rocked the financial world by declaring bankruptcy due
to the effects of an accounting scandal. Earlier in the year, Enron had been the seventh largest corporation in the country. 1 This energy trading and utilities giant had
become a dominant player by aggressively benefitting from the federal deregulation
of the energy markets.2 Enron’s collapse erased more than $60 billion in shareholder
value and caused thousands of employees to lose their jobs and pensions. 3
Enron proved not to be an anomaly. Soon after the corporation’s collapse, the
financial markets were further roiled when WorldCom, Adelphia, and Tyco, among
others, declared bankruptcy because of accounting fraud.4 Congress responded to this
wave of scandals by passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which imposed greater
accountability on publicly traded companies and their auditors.5
Andrew Fastow, Enron’s CFO, was a pivotal figure in Enron’s collapse. He created two special purpose entities (SPEs)—LJM1 Cayman LP (LJM1) and LJM2 CoInvestment LP (LJM2)—to serve as a hedge against potential downturns in Enron
stock.6 Fastow and his associates served as the managers of these SPEs.7 Because of
Fastow’s dual management roles, Enron should have disclosed to its shareholders
that the partnerships were related-party transactions, defined as deals between entities with special, preexisting relationships,8 which Enron failed to do.9 Although related-party transactions are legal, they can create conflicts of interest that have the
potential of harming their shareholders.10 Specifically, these transactions “can create
the impression that an insider is using company assets for personal benefit, and that

1. Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 9 (2002).
2. See John R. Kroger, Enron, Fraud, and Securities Reform: An Enron Prosecutor’s
Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 57, 64 (2005).
3. Steve Hargreaves, Ex-Enron Workers: Keep Skilling in Prison, CNN MONEY (May
10, 2013, 6:33 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/05/10/news/companies/enron-skilling
[https://perma.cc/3QYK-S6K8].
4. Neil H. Aronson, Preventing Future Enrons: Implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 127, 127 (2002).
5. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
6. W. STEVE ALBRECHT, CHAD O. ALBRECHT, CONAN C. ALBRECHT & MARK F.
ZIMBELMAN, FRAUD EXAMINATION 440–41 (5th ed. 2016).
7. Id.
8. Related-Party Transaction, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r
/related-partytransaction.asp [https://perma.cc/2WAV-WEM7].
9. See ALBRECHT ET AL., supra note 6, at 441.
10. Elizabeth A. Gordon, Elaine Henry & Darius Palia, Related Party Transactions and
Corporate Governance, 9 ADVANCES IN FIN. ECON. 1, 7 (2004) (explaining the conflict of interest view of related-party transactions).
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the company is getting the short end of the stick.” 11 Indeed, Fastow did take advantage of this conflict of interest by making millions of dollars from the SPEs and
using the illegal proceeds to invest in other interests.12
Enron’s collapse was significant because it exposed the deficiencies of gatekeepers that had the responsibility of protecting the integrity of the markets. 13 These gatekeepers included Enron’s auditor Arthur Andersen, independent analysts, credit rating agencies, corporate boards, and the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC).14 In the case of the Enron debacle, all of these watchdogs failed to detect the
dangers caused by Fastow’s conflict of interest.
Related-party transactions are now posing a threat to the charter school sector.
Charter schools are a deregulated departure from traditional public schools because
they are exempted from laws governing budgets and financial transparency. 15 Similar
to Fastow, unscrupulous individuals and corporations are using their control over
charter schools and their affiliates to obtain unreasonable management fees for their
services and funnel money intended for charter schools into other business
ventures.16
In spite of this evidence, the federal government has consistently attempted to
increase the number of charter schools without pushing for oversight. 17 This policy
approach is alarming because it will create more opportunities for illegal relatedparty transactions.18 Also, this approach runs the risk of harming students in lowincome and minority communities—the very children whom charter schools are supposed to serve.19 Therefore, charter school gatekeepers must learn from the Enron
debacle by becoming more prepared to guard against the dangers posed by relatedparty transactions.20 These gatekeepers include auditors, governing boards, authorizers, state education agencies (SEAs), and the U.S. Department of Education.
In this Article, we discuss how some charter school officials have engaged in
Enron-like related-party transactions to defraud charter schools. We also identify

11. Peter Loftus & Marcelo Prince, Even Good Insider Deals Raise Doubts, WALL ST. J.
(May 7, 2003).
12. Mark P. Holtzman, Elizabeth Venuti & Robert Fonfeder, Enron and the Raptors, 73
CPA J. 24, 25 (2003).
13. See, e.g., Marianne M. Jennings, A Primer on Enron: Lessons from A Perfect Storm
of Financial Reporting, Corporate Governance and Ethical Cultural Failures, 39 CAL. W. L.
REV. 163 (2003); Kroger, supra note 2; Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets,
Corporate Disclosure, and Enron, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 394 (2004).
14. Kroger, supra note 2, at 59–60 (identifying auditors, independent analysts, corporate
boards, and the SEC). Kroger does not include credit rating agencies as gatekeepers, but
acknowledges that many commentators do. Id. at 60 n.12. Other commentators include Macey,
supra note 13, at 403 and David Millon, Who “Caused” the Enron Debacle?, 60 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 309, 313 (2003).
15. Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Toward a Pragmatic Understanding of Status-Consciousness:
The Case of Deregulated Education, 50 DUKE L.J. 753, 765 (2000).
16. See infra Part III.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See id.
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several measures that can be taken to strengthen the ability of charter school gatekeepers to protect against this danger. This Article is divided into four Parts. Part I
describes how Fastow used his management of Enron and the SPEs to obtain illegal
profits contrary to the interests of the former company. Part II discusses why the
gatekeepers in the financial sector failed to stop the related-party transactions between Enron and the LJM entities. Part III provides examples of how individuals in
the charter school sector are benefitting from their control over charter schools and
their affiliates in a manner similar to Fastow. Part IV analyzes, inter alia, pertinent
statutory and regulatory provisions that apply to state and federal gatekeepers. We
perform this task to identify the steps that legislators and policymakers can take to
increase the gatekeepers’ ability to protect against harmful related-party transactions.
I: OVERVIEW OF ENRON
A. Enron and Deregulation
Enron’s business model took advantage of the federal deregulation of the energy
markets. Prior to deregulation, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
had set rates for the production of gas pipelines and gas wells.21 The price regulation
of the competitive gas production sector had created shortages in natural gas production in the late 1960s.22 In response to the energy crisis of the 1970s, Congress passed
the National Energy Act of 1978.23 A key provision of the statute deregulated natural
gas prices to encourage more natural gas production. 24
Enron recognized that the newly deregulated natural gas industry was grossly inefficient because producers struggled to identify and contract with potential customers.25 Enron addressed this problem through the creation of the “gas bank.” 26 The gas
bank matched buyers of natural gas, who wanted to lock in current prices for future
delivery, with producers who wanted to ensure that they had customers in the future.27 Enron made substantial profits because producers and users stopped trying to
enter the market, but instead, decided to deal with Enron. 28
Enron then tried to replicate its success with the gas bank by pouring billions of
dollars into other sectors. 29 This diversification strategy failed, however, because
Enron used approaches that succeeded in the gas sector, instead of hiring managers
with business experience in these new areas.30 As a result, by the late 1990s, Enron

21. Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Can Energy Markets Be Trusted? The Effect of the Rise and
Fall of Enron on Energy Markets, 4 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 1, 7–8 (2004).
22. Id. at 8.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Kroger, supra note 2, at 64.
26. Pride at Root of Skilling’s Downfall, USA TODAY (Oct. 24, 2006, 4:32 AM), http://
usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/energy/2006-10-23-skilling-profile-usat_x.htm
[https://perma.cc/4Q3C-MGKU].
27. Id.
28. Kroger, supra note 2, at 64.
29. Id. at 65.
30. Id. at 66.
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had lost more than $10 billion in cash. Enron exacerbated its financial problems by
spending extravagantly on personnel costs.31
B. The LJM SPEs
To bankroll the company’s profligate spending on diversification and personnel,
Enron used multiple strategies to improve its credit rating, while hiding its true economic position from the company’s lenders.32 One tactic involved the creation of
SPEs, which are entities that are designed to fulfill specific legal purposes. 33 Enron’s
SPEs were conceived to remove debt from its holdings. 34 Fastow oversaw two
SPEs—LJM1 and LJM2—which played a major part in Enron’s downfall.35 LJM1
protected the profits that Enron had gained from a transaction with a high-speed internet provider named Rhythms NetConnections (“Rhythms”).36 LJM2 was a larger
version of LJM1.37 LJM2 also invested in another group of SPEs, known as the
“Raptors,” to serve as additional hedges.38 Both LJM transactions used Enron stock,
which was doing very well at the time, as a hedge against the potential collapse of
Enron’s assets.39 Fastow’s stewardship of LJM entities required Enron’s Board of
Directors to waive its code of ethics, which prohibited Enron employees from engaging in activities that would conflict with its interests. 40
To avoid classification as subsidiaries, which would have forced Enron to consolidate the SPEs into the company’s financial statements, an independent owner had
to exercise control of the SPEs.41 The LJM entities failed this requirement because
Fastow exercised control over their operations.42 Fastow benefited greatly from his
self-dealing. In fact, over a two-year period, Fastow received more than $30 million
in management fees from these entities.43
Fastow also conspired with others to use LJM1 to enrich himself at the expense
of Enron’s shareholders. Because of a dramatic increase in the value of Enron stock,
the value of the hedge also rose sharply.44 Fastow responded by creating a scheme
that enabled him and his fellow co-conspirators to pocket $30 million.45 Some of the

31. Id. at 67.
32. Id. at 68–69.
33. Holtzman et al., supra note 12, at 26.
34. Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in
Corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1309, 1309–10 (2002).
35. ALBRECHT ET AL., supra note 6, at 441.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Milton C. Regan, Jr., Teaching Enron, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1139, 1213 (2005).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1238.
41. ALBRECHT ET AL., supra note 6, at 440.
42. Id. at 441.
43. Kroger, supra note 2, at 96.
44. See DENIS COLLINS, BEHAVING BADLY: ETHICAL LESSONS FROM ENRON 85–86 (2006).
45. Id.
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funds went to an SPE that Fastow created, called Southampton Place ($11.7 million).46 Later, Fastow distributed $4.5 million of these funds to his eponymous family
foundation, which had invested $25,000.47
C. Enron’s Collapse
Enron’s hedging scheme was fundamentally flawed because it failed to anticipate
the possibility that Enron’s stock would fall at the same time as the stock held by the
LJM entities.48 However, that is exactly what happened to the Raptors. Consequently,
the Raptors incurred huge credit shortfalls. 49 The Raptors were further flawed by an
accounting mischaracterization. In exchange for the loan of Enron stock, the Raptors
gave Enron promissory notes totaling $1 billion.50 Enron mischaracterized the promissory notes as assets, thus wrongly increasing shareholders’ equity by $1 billion.51
In August 2001, Enron and its auditor Arthur Andersen realized the accounting
error.52 Enron responded by terminating the Raptors.53 This termination required
Enron to repurchase the shares it had lent the Raptors at a cost of $1 billion in shareholder equity.54 Also, Enron wrote off an additional $200 million due to losses on
stock investments made by the Raptors.55 On October 16, Enron reported the reduction of $1.2 billion in shareholder equity, along with $1.01 billion in losses from bad
investments.56 Enron’s declarations undermined investor confidence, causing
Enron’s stock to plummet. Six weeks later, Enron declared bankruptcy. 57
II: ENRON’S GATEKEEPER PROBLEMS
A. Arthur Andersen
A number of gatekeepers had the responsibility of protecting shareholders from
Enron’s illegal related-party transactions. One of these gatekeepers was Arthur
Andersen, Enron’s auditor. Andersen had a duty to warn Enron’s Board of Directors
about “significant unusual transactions,” including “off-balance-sheet financing, and
accounting for equity investments.”58 According to Neal Batson, the court-appointed

46. Id. at 86.
47. Id.
48. ROBERT BRYCE, PIPE DREAMS: GREED, EGO, AND THE DEATH OF ENRON 230 (2002).
49. See id.
50. Id. at 311–12.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 310–12.
57. Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethical
Issues, 58 BUS. LAW. 143, 163 (2002).
58. NEAL BATSON, IN RE: ENRON CORP., ET AL., DEBTORS, CH. 11, FINAL REPORT 24 (Case
No. 01-16034 (AJG)) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., 2003), http://www.concernedshareholders.com
/CCS_ENRON_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/852M-EEMZ].
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examiner for Enron’s bankruptcy, Andersen accountants knew about the conflict of
interest created by the LJM1/Rhythms transaction, but failed to warn the Board about
their concerns over the agreement.59
Andersen’s failure was unexpected because the accounting giant apparently had
little incentive to risk its reputation. At the time of Enron’s collapse, Andersen had
2300 clients.60 While Andersen did anticipate earning $100 million in fees from
Enron, this amount was a fraction of the $9 billion in annual revenue for the accounting firm.61 In fact, during the 1990s, many courts believed that auditing firms would
refrain from acting so irrationally for exactly this reason.62 In the leading case stating
this proposition, DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, the Seventh Circuit rejected the claim that
an accounting firm had committed securities fraud by helping a failing bank understate poor performing loans by $4 billion.63 The court rejected the argument that the
accounting firm possessed the mental state of mind necessary for establishing a securities violation.64 The court reached this conclusion because the partners and associates had nothing to gain from helping the bank commit fraud.65 The risk to the
accountants’ reputations far outweighed the financial benefits they would have derived from aiding and abetting the alleged fraud. 66
Researchers have attributed Andersen’s gatekeeping failure to various conflicts
of interest. One form of conflict was the combining of auditing and consulting services.67 Prior to the mid-1990s, few auditing firms participated in consulting activities.68 However, during the late 1990s, auditing firms engaged in consulting and auditing activities because consulting was so lucrative. 69 In fact, a survey conducted
during that period found that corporations paid their auditor for consulting services
at three times the amount for auditing services.70 Andersen’s relationship with Enron
fit this trend. More than seventy percent of the fees that Andersen received from
Enron came from consulting.71 Thus, participation in consulting activities might have
eroded Andersen’s independence because the company was loath to lose its consulting fees.72

59. Id. at 44–45.
60. John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57
BUS. LAW. 1403, 1406 (2002).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 901 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1990).
64. Id. at 627–28.
65. Id. at 629.
66. Id.
67. John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of
the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 291–93 (2004).
68. Id. at 291.
69. Justin Cummins & Meg Luger Nikolai, ERISA Reform in a Post-Enron World, 39 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 563, 587 (2006).
70. Coffee, supra note 67, at 291.
71. See Gary M. Cunningham & Jean E. Harris, Enron and Arthur Andersen: The Case
of the Crooked E and the Fallen A, 3 GLOBAL PERSP. ACC’T EDUC. 27, 43 (2006).
72. See Coffee, supra note 67, at 293.
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Another form of conflict came in the intertwined relationships between the staffs
of Andersen and Enron.73 David Duncan, Andersen’s chief auditor of the Enron account, was a close friend of Richard Causey, Enron’s chief accounting officer. 74 In
fact, the relationship between the two was so close that Enron employees had a difficult time determining who was working for Enron and who was working for
Andersen.75
Researchers have also asserted that the deterrents in place to guard against auditor
fraud were insufficient.76 One such deterrent was the Public Oversight Board (POB),
which the accounting profession created in 1977 in an attempt at self-regulation.77
This peer review system proved to be ineffective, however. Prior to its disbanding in
2002, no firm received a negative review.78 Critics even characterized the POB’s
peer-review program as “incestuous” and a “backslapping exercise.”79 In the 1990s,
both the Supreme Court and Congress weakened the effectiveness of yet another deterrent, shareholder lawsuits: In 1994, the Supreme Court ruled in Central Bank of
Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. that private parties may not
bring private causes of action against gatekeepers under § 10(b) of the Securities and
Exchange Act for aiding and abetting fraud.80 One year later, Congress enacted the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). The PSLRA imposed stricter securities fraud pleading requirements and eliminated the ability of plaintiffs to obtain
treble damages through civil Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) challenges.81
B. Independent Analysts
Independent analysts also failed to protect shareholders from Enron’s duplicity.
Independent analysts collect and process information about the companies they follow. Based on this information, analysts issue reports advising their clients about a
company’s prospects.82 The analysts tracking Enron failed at this task. For instance,
in October 2001, all sixteen analysts followed by Thomson Financial/First Call rated
Enron as a “buy,” despite the fact that Enron stock had fallen fifty percent. 83 Further
in November 2001—after the SEC had announced that it was investigating Enron—

73. Jennings, supra note 13, at 164.
74. Id. at 170 n.23.
75. Marianne M. Jennings, Restoring Ethical Gumption in the Corporation: A Federalist
Paper on Corporate Governance – Restoration of Active Virtue in the Corporate Structure To
Curb the “Yeehaw Culture” in Organizations, 3 WYO. L. REV. 387, 408 (2003).
76. Kroger, supra note 2, at 91.
77. Joel Seligman, No One Can Serve Two Masters: Corporate and Securities Law After
Enron, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 472–73 (2002).
78. Id. at 473.
79. Id. at 472; Kroger, supra note 2, at 91 n.166.
80. 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994).
81. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
82. Millon, supra note 14, at 313.
83. Macey, supra note 13, at 403–04.
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eleven of the thirteen analysts following Enron still rated the company as a “buy.” 84
This poor showing by the analysts was not surprising. The investment banks that hire
the analysts want positive ratings for companies, which raise stock prices and in turn
produce capital for their investment clients. 85
C. Credit Rating Agencies
Credit rating agencies are independent entities that assess an institution’s ability
to pay its financial obligations.86 The two major credit rating agencies—Standard &
Poor’s and Moody’s—also failed to fulfill their gatekeeping role. These entities did
not downgrade Enron’s debt below investment grade until four days before the firm
declared bankruptcy.87 The credit rating agencies probably failed to perform their
corporate governance role because downgrades frequently lead to bankruptcy. 88
Ironically, this reluctance to downgrade Enron had the unintended effect of undermining the agencies’ ability to serve as effective monitors.89
D. Enron’s Board of Directors
A corporation’s board of directors has a fiduciary duty to its investors to monitor
management performance.90 With respect to the LJM transactions, the Enron board
failed in its gatekeeping role in two ways.91 First, the board should not have waived
its code of ethics, which prohibited Enron’s employees from occupying positions that
conflicted with their fiduciary duties to the company, to permit Fastow to manage
the SPEs. Because Fastow was Enron’s CFO, the conflict of interest was too severe. 92
Second, the board failed to ensure that no one profited from the LJM transactions at
the expense of Enron’s shareholders.93 Notably, it never asked Fastow how much
money he was making from the LJM agreements. 94 This lapse was critical because it
was later revealed that Fastow illegally accrued $30 million from the deals. 95
There are several reasons for the board’s failure to provide sufficient oversight
over Enron’s SPE transactions. For instance, Enron was a Fortune 500 company with
thousands of employees, complex financing, and many product and service lines.
Boards of directors do not have much time to commit to the difficult task of providing
oversight. And these directors were certainly not as devoted to supervising Enron’s

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, OFFICE INV. EDUC. & ADVOCACY, INVESTOR BULLETIN: THE
ABC’S OF CREDIT RATINGS 1 (2013), https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/ib_creditratings.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5BKA-5DW2].
87. Macey, supra note 13, at 405.
88. Id. at 406.
89. Id.
90. Kroger, supra note 2, at 94.
91. Id. at 95.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 96.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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performance as the company’s management.96 Also, boards of directors have little at
stake in the direction that a company might go. The performance of a corporation
does not seriously impact their reputations, and board members usually “have insurance to indemnify them [from] any liability stemming from their actions.”97
E. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
The SEC is the federal governmental agency tasked with the responsibility of preventing securities fraud and protecting investors. Because the SEC had the same information as independent analysts, the agency should have found Enron’s confusing
financial statements and “disturbingly opaque” disclosures of its SPEs alarming.98
Yet, the SEC failed to mount an investigation until after the company was doomed.
In fact, the SEC did not review any of Enron’s quarterly (10-Q) or annual (10-K)
findings from 1998 to 2001.99 If the SEC’s attorneys and accountants had reviewed
Enron’s financial statements during this period, they would have probably identified
major problems that warranted further examination. 100
The agency’s leadership claimed that it did not have the resources to investigate
Enron because the number of publicly owned companies dramatically increased in
the 1990s at a much faster rate than the SEC’s capacity to provide oversight. 101
Consequently, the SEC asserted that it focused its limited resources on reviewing
public offerings instead of corporate giants like Enron. John Kroger, who worked as
a trial attorney with the United States Department of Justice’s Enron Task Force,
rejects this assertion. Because “Fortune 500 companies play a critical role in the
American securities market,” Kroger claimed the SEC had “a particular duty to ensure that these behemoths are playing by the rules.” 102 Instead, Kroger attributed the
SEC’s failure to poor management and poor prioritizing. 103 In support of his assertion, Kroger cited a post-Enron study of SEC management practices, which found
that supervisors assigned numerical goals that employees reviewing filings had to
satisfy.104 Because of these incentives, it was not surprising that SEC staff failed to
examine Enron’s complicated SEC filings. 105
III: CHARTER SCHOOLS AND RELATED-PARTY TRANSACTIONS
A. Charter School Deregulation and Private Investors
Some individuals and corporations in the charter school sector have used Enronlike related-party transactions to obtain profits at the expense of the very charter

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 97–98.
Id. at 98.
Id. at 107.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 108.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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schools that they are serving. Charter schools are often distinguished from traditional
public schools on the ground that they have greater accountability in exchange for
greater autonomy.106 Accountability comes in the form of the charter, a contract that
defines the educational goals that the charter school must attain.107 Autonomy comes
in the form of deregulation, which frequently involves exemption from state laws
that govern budgets and financial transparency.108
Forty-three states and the District of Columbia have charter school legislation.109
There are more than 6800 charter schools in the nation serving 2.9 million students.110 Charter schools, which presently make up six percent of public school enrollment, have experienced substantial growth since their inception. In fact, enrollment in charter schools has increased six-fold in the last fifteen years. 111
Major philanthropic organizations have invested heavily in the charter school sector.112 For example, the Walton Family Foundation, which was established by the
founder of the Walmart retail chain, has pledged $1 billion to support charter
schools.113 Reed Hastings, the founder of Netflix and a long-time supporter of charter
schools, has created a $100 million education foundation. 114 Hedge funds and other
private investors have also become interested in investing in charter schools. 115
The attention of philanthropic groups and private investors has dramatically impacted the charter school sector. For example, the education management organizations (EMOs) that these groups operate have become the dominant players in the

106. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions About Public, Charter Schools, UNCOMMON
SCHOOLS, http://www.uncommonschools.org/faq-what-is-charter-school [https://perma.cc
/2PJR-FG2M]; About Charter Schools, NAT’L ALLIANCE PUB. CHARTER SCHOOLS, http://www
.publiccharters.org/get-the-facts/public-charter-schools/ [https://perma.cc/BRQ7-74JM].
107. Frequently Asked Questions About Public, Charter Schools, supra note 106.
108. Id.
109. JENNIFER THOMSEN, EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES, 50-STATE COMPARISON:
CHARTER SCHOOL POLICIES (2017), http://www.ecs.org/charter-school-policies/ [https://
perma.cc/TR4Y-H7YU].
110. NAT’L ALL. PUB. CHARTER SCHS., A CLOSER LOOK AT THE CHARTER SCHOOL
MOVEMENT 1 (2016), http://www.publiccharters.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/NewClosed-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3ER-854A].
111. Id.
112. Noelle Quam, Note, Big Philanthropy’s Unrestrained Influence: A Call for Change,
21 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 601, 620 (2015).
113. Abby Jackson, The Walmart Family Has Pledged $1 Billion To Help a Polarizing
Kind of School, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 19, 2016, 3:24 P.M.), http://www.businessinsider.com
/walmart-family-pledged-1-billion-to-charter-schools-2016-1 [https://perma.cc/QXQ9-L8XK].
114. Emma Brown, Netflix Chief Announces $100 Million for Education, WASH. POST
(Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/education/wp/2016/01/13/netflixchief-announces-100-million-fund-for-education [https://perma.cc/8M84-C97J].
115. See, e.g., Stephen Vita, Inside the Hedge Fund Infatuation with Charter Schools,
INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 9, 2016, 4:04 AM), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing
/030916/inside-hedge-fund-infatuation-charter-schools.asp [https://perma.cc/F3UH-LM73];
Power Players: Pennsylvania’s Top Political Donors, 2011-2012, P UB. SOURCE,
http://powerplayers-pa.herokuapp.com/donors/vahan-gureghian-i [https://perma.cc/6MBPMJS6] (describing the political contributions of the CEO of Charter School Management
Inc.).
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charter school sector.116 EMOs are for-profit or nonprofit entities that provide educational and management services to charter schools.117 EMOs manage between
thirty-five to forty percent of all charter schools, accounting for about forty-five percent of charter school enrollments. 118
Charter schools attract investors because of the potential for new revenue
streams.119 For instance, the New Market Tax Credits (NMTC) program provides
investors the opportunity to make profits from charter-school real estate transactions.120 Enacted as a component of the Community Relief Tax Credit Act of 2000,121
the NMTC was designed to encourage investment in low-income communities.122
The NMTC accomplishes this goal by providing investors in a community development entity (CDE) a thirty-nine percent tax credit over a seven-year period.123 A CDE
is a corporation or partnership that provides capital for investment in low-income
communities.124 An educational organization such as a charter school foundation can
use NMTC funding to build a charter school. 125
For-profit entities can double their investment in charter-school real estate projects by taking advantage of the NMTC as well as other federal tax credits. 126 Forprofit entities can also obtain revenue from charter schools through lease payments
for the use of the facilities. For instance, the Robert Bacon Academy (RBA), a forprofit EMO operating in North Carolina, received $1.5 million in rent, as well as

116. BRUCE BAKER & GARY MIRON, THE BUSINESS OF CHARTER SCHOOLING:
UNDERSTANDING THE P OLICIES THAT CHARTER OPERATORS USE FOR FINANCIAL BENEFIT 7
(2015), http://nepc.colorado.edu/files/rb_baker-miron_charter_revenue_0.pdf [https://
perma.cc/ZA4F-69CE].
117. Id. Charter school advocates often distinguish for-profit EMOs from nonprofit
charter management organizations (CMOs). Apparently, they make this distinction to
counter criticisms of fraud and mismanagement in the charter school sector. See, e.g.,
Arianna Prothero, Audit: How Charter School Management Groups Pose Risks to Federal
Funds, EDUC. WK.: CHARTERS & CHOICE (Oct. 4, 2016, 4:15 PM), http://blogs.edweek.org
/edweek/charterschoice/2016/10/audit_charter_school_management_groups_pose_risk_t_
federal_funds.html [https://perma.cc/63GT-TZ8N]. However, in Imagine Schools’ real
estate dealshow, even the CEO of a nonprofit management organization can engage in
related-party transactions with for-profit entities that work against the interests of the
charter schools served by the nonprofit management organization. See infra notes 127–44.
118. BAKER & MIRON, supra note 116, at 7.
119. Elaine Magliaro, Charter Schools and the Profit Motive, JONATHAN TURLEY (Mar.
16, 2013), https://jonathanturley.org/2013/03/16/charter-schools-and-the-profit-motive/
[https://perma.cc/VM2R-XKPJ].
120. 26 U.S.C.A. § 45D (2011 & West Supp. 2017).
121. Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 121, 114 Stat. 2763A-605 (2000).
122. Michael I. Sanders, How Nonprofit Organizations Can Use the New Markets Tax
Credit, 21 TAX’N EXEMPTS 3, 3 (Nov./Dec. 2009).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 8. Juan Gonzalez, Albany Charter Cash Cow: Big Banks Making a Bundle on
New School Construction as Schools Bear the Cost, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 6, 2010, 8:48
P.M.), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/education/albany-charter-cash-big-banksmaking-bundle-new-construction-schools-bear-cost-article-1.448008
[https://perma.cc
/PBM5-A55Y].
126. Gonzalez, supra note 125.
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almost $549,000 for maintenance during the 2013–14 school year—from one charter school alone.127
Investors can also obtain profits through the management fees that EMOs
charge for their services. 128 Management fees can be very generous. In the 2013–
14 school year, RBA received a management fee of sixteen percent of its school’s
expense as well as “additional incentive payments based on student achievement.”129 Two charter schools paid RBA nearly “$2.4 million in fees and incentives
out of just $13 million in total revenue.”130
B. Examples of Enron-Like Related-Party Transactions
1. Imagine Schools
Imagine Schools’ real estate deals provide an example of the ways that charter
school investors are engaging in Enron-like related-party transactions. Founded by
Dennis Bakke and his wife, Imagine Schools is a nonprofit EMO that operates
sixty-three charter school campuses enrolling more than 33,000 students in eleven
states and the District of Columbia. 131 Imagine Schools uses real estate investment
trusts (REITs) and triple-net leases for its real estate deals. 132 A REIT is a company
“that owns and manages . . . propert[y] . . . and is required to distribute ninety
percent of [its] income to investors.” 133 A REIT is similar to a mutual fund because
it enables shareholders to obtain a steady income stream. 134 A triple-net lease is a
lease agreement whereby the lessee is responsible for rent fees as well as related
costs, including taxes, insurance, and facilities maintenance.135 Thus, triple-net
leases can be especially costly for charter schools and put a great deal of stress on
annual operating expenses.136
Imagine Schools conducts many of its real estate deals through its for-profit subsidiary, SchoolHouse Finance (SchoolHouse).137 In a typical deal, a charter school

127. Thomas A. Kelly III, North Carolina Charter Schools’ (Non-?) Compliance with
State and Federal Nonprofit Law, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1757, 1794 (2015).
128. Robert Cotto Jr., Show Me the (Charter Management Fee) Money!, CT NEWS JUNKIE
(May 20, 2015, 7:59 AM), http://www.ctnewsjunkie.com/archives/entry/op-ed_show_me_the
_charter_management_fee_money/ [https://perma.cc/5X3A-LFJC].
129. Kelly, supra note 127, at 1793.
130. Id. at 1793–94.
131. Imagine Schools Completes Transition to Non-Profit Status, IMAGINE SCHOOLS.,
(Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.imagineschools.org/2015/08/imagine-schools-completestransition-to-non-profit-status [https://perma.cc/57ZQ-EDL5].
132. PIET VAN LIER, POLICY MATTERS OHIO, PUBLIC GOOD VS. PRIVATE PROFIT: IMAGINE
SCHOOLS, INC. IN OHIO 3 (2010), http://www.policymattersohio.org/wp-content/uploads
/2011/09/ImagineSchools2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZPY9-AL8S].
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Bill Stoller, Morgan Stanley’s Top 5 REIT Picks for Q4, BEZINGA (Oct. 1, 2014, 12:21
PM), http://www.benzinga.com/analyst-ratings/analyst-color/14/10/4888872/morgan-stanleystop-5-reit-picks-for-q4 [https://perma.cc/25YX-WP98].
136. BAKER & MIRON, supra note 116, at 33.
137. NONPROFIT CHARTER SCHOOLS HIDE FOR-PROFIT REAL ESTATE DEALS, FOR-PROFIT
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operated by Imagine Schools leases the building from SchoolHouse. In turn,
SchoolHouse sells the property to Entertainment Properties (EPR) Trust, a REIT that
has partnered with Imagine Schools and SchoolHouse.138 EPR Trust then leases the
property to SchoolHouse at a lower rate than the lease paid by the charter school.139
The rent of charter schools operated by Imagine Schools can be exorbitant. Many
charter schools spend around fourteen percent of their public funding on building
rent.140 By contrast, charter schools run by Imagine Schools spend up to an excessive
forty percent of their public funding on rent, creating a tight budget for educational
necessities, such as textbooks.141 Thus, these triple-net leases can be even more costly
to the charter schools in the long run than direct mortgages. 142
In Renaissance Academy for Math & Science of Missouri v. Imagine Schools, a
federal district court ruled that the EMO committed a breach of fiduciary duty by
causing a charter school governing board to enter into unreasonable lease agreements
with SchoolHouse.143 According to the court, these leases “clearly constituted selfdealing.”144 Because Imagine Schools was the sole owner of SchoolHouse, the EMO
also benefited from the excessive leases.145
As a fiduciary, Imagine Schools had a duty to the charter school to refrain from
self-dealing.146 The EMO could act as an adverse party to the charter school only if
it had obtained informed consent from the charter school governing board.147 The
court found no evidence that Imagine Schools had informed the board how it would
benefit from the leases, or that their high cost “would result in lower-than-average
instructional expenditures, including textbooks, classroom supplies, and teacher salaries, which was exactly what happened.”148 The court ordered Imagine Schools to
pay $935,400 in damages for the breach of fiduciary duty. 149
2. Ivy Academia Charter School
Yevgeny Selivanov, the founder and CEO of Ivy Academia Charter School, located near Los Angeles, also engaged in related-party transactions that worked
against the best interests of the charter schools that he operated. Ivy Academia
Charter School is a K–12 school that educates almost 1000 students.150 In April 2013,

EDUC. (2012), http://ic.galegroup.com/ic/ovic/ViewpointsDetailsPage/DocumentToolsPortlet
Window?displayGroupName=Viewpoints&jsid=debfc351f8b49a01edd183ae07060240&acti
on=2&catId=&documentId=GALE%7CEJ3010774219&u=magn0126&zid=1116959505bea
971f514b6b84cf25fa6 [https://perma.cc/BUY5-5U6U].
138. VAN LIER, supra note 132, at 24–25.
139. NONPROFIT CHARTER SCHOOLS, supra note 137.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. VAN LIER, supra note 132, at 28.
143. No. 4:13-CV-00645-NKL, 2014 WL 7267033, at *10 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 18, 2014).
144. Id. at 17.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 18.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 18–19.
149. Id. at 24–25.
150. U.S. NEWS, IVY ACADEMIA, http://www.usnews.com/education/best-high-schools
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a California jury convicted Selivanov and his wife and co-founder, Tatyana
Berkovich, of felonies and misdemeanors related to their actions as founders of the
Ivy Academia Charter School.151 Later that year, the trial court sentenced Selivanov
to nearly five years in state prison. 152 Berkovich was sentenced to forty-five days in
county jail, 320 hours of service to the community and five years of probation. 153
The court imposed a harsher sentence on Selivanov because he was the main architect of the “sophisticated” scam.154 Selivanov, who had an MBA, had previously
worked at Goldman Sachs,155 which describes itself as “a leading global investment
banking, securities, and investment managing firm.”156
Selivanov and Berkovich were also co-owners of a private preschool, Academy
Just for Kids (AJFK), which shared a campus with the charter school.157 In 2004,
AJFK entered into a sublease for that campus at a monthly rent of $18,390.158 AJFK
then assigned the sublease to Alternative, the parent company of Ivy Academia
Charter School. Alternative assumed responsibility for the monthly rent payments.159
In 2007, AJFK and Alternative entered into another agreement, which increased
the monthly rent from $18,370 to $43,870, even though: (1) the lower amount was
the fair market value, (2) the lower rent was valid until 2014, and (3) the original
lease prohibited rents from being increased by more than five percent annually. 160
Selivanov and Berkovich did not present the rent increase to Alternative’s board until
October 2008.161 The board not only approved the rent increase, but it also made the
rate effective as of July 1, 2007.162 As a result, Alternative paid a net rent increase of
nearly $238,000.163 At trial, an expert characterized the rent increase as a “sham
transaction” because there was no sound basis for the increased payment. 164
At the same time of the rent increase, Selivanov and Berkovich secured a bank
loan of $520,000 for the remodeling of the facility housing the charter school. 165
AJFK and Ivy Academia Charter School then entered into an asset sale for the remodeling of the property. Ivy Academia Charter School transferred the leasehold

/california/districts/los-angeles-unified-school-district/ivy-academia-91570 [https://perma.cc
/5JNJ-CBMN].
151. Kelly Goff, Ivy Academia Founders Sentenced in Fraud Case, L.A. DAILY NEWS (Oct.
4, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.dailynews.com/general-news/20131004/ivy-academiafounders-sentenced-in-fraud-case [https://perma.cc/3ATY-DDBN].
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. GOLDMAN SACHS, WHO WE ARE, http://www.goldmansachs.com/who-we-are/at-aglance/index.html [https://perma.cc/HEF7-AW8H].
157. Brief for Respondent at 3, People. v. Selivanov, 210 Cal. Rptr. 3d 117 (Cal. Ct. App.
2016) (No. B252894).
158. Id. at 6.
159. Id. at 11.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 12.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 13.

1136

INDIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 93:1121

improvements to AJFK. In exchange for this transfer, AJFK assumed and made payments on the bank loan.166 These loan payments were characterized as rent payments.167 However, the asset sale was invalid because the original lease provided that
assets were to remain with the property. Thus, AJFK should have been making the
payments on the asset sale.168 Also, Ivy Academia Charter School’s payments for the
bank loan should not have been characterized as rent payments because the rent increase and asset sales were separate transactions.169 At trial, a forensic accountant
testified that Ivy Academia Charter School’s payment of the loan and the accounting
method of recording the rent payment as a lease were inappropriate.170
3. American Indian Model Charter Schools
Ben Chavis, the former superintendent of the American Indian Model Charter
Schools (AIMS), and his wife used inappropriate related-party transactions to funnel
public funds and illegal payments from parents into the businesses they ran. The
AIMS are a system of two middle schools and a high school that are located in the
Oakland area, educating a total of more than 1100 students. 171 In December 2011,
California’s Fiscal Crisis Assistance and Management Team (FCMAT) received a
request from the local county board of education to conduct an extraordinary audit
of the schools after it had received multiple allegations of inappropriate related-party
transactions.172 FCMAT is a state agency that helps local school districts satisfy their
financial and management responsibilities.173 One month after FCMAT agreed to do
the audit, Chavis resigned from his position as superintendent. 174

166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 14.
171. American Indian Public Charter School II is a K–8 school that educates 650 students.
Am. Indian Model Schs., Home, AIPSC II 171 12TH STREET OAKLAND, CA,
http://www.aimschools.org/apps/pages/index.jsp?uREC_ID=365094&type=d&pREC_ID=8
11338 [https://perma.cc/U2KC-LDZG]. American Indian Public Charter School educates 250
students from grades 6–8. Am. Indian Model Schs., Home, AIPSC 171 12TH STREET OAKLAND,
CA, http://www.aimschools.org/apps/pages/index.jsp?uREC_ID=365093&type=d&pREC_
ID=811337 [https://perma.cc/7FVQ-AG8X]. American Indian Public High School has an
enrollment of 350 students. Am. Indian Model Schs., Home, AIPHS 746 GRAND AVENUE
OAKLAND, CA, http://www.aimschools.org/apps/pages/index.jsp?uREC_ID=365095&type
=d&pREC_ID=811339 [https://perma.cc/T5JZ-WHQW].
172. FISCAL CRISIS & MGMT. ASSISTANCE TEAM, ALAMEDA COUNTY OFFICE OF
EDUCATION: EXTRAORDINARY AUDIT OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN MODEL CHARTER SCHOOLS 1
(2012), http://fcmat.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2014/02/AlamedaCOEfinalreport61212
92.pdf [https://perma.cc/FZB2-X8N2].
173. FISCAL CRISIS & MGMT. ASSISTANCE TEAM, FCMAT’s Function, http://fcmat.org
/fcmats-function/ [https://perma.cc/8QFQ-NKYV].
174. lumbeelovechild, AICPS Board Meeting Conflict of Interest Concerns, YOUTUBE
(Jan. 15, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qFHzGKVit3o [https://perma.cc/QGP48WLQ].
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In June 2012, FCMAT published the results of its audit. The agency found that
from 2007 to 2011, Chavis and his wife had received almost $3.8 million in payments
from school accounts.175 Many of these payments were linked to related-party transactions that were, indeed, in violation of the state’s conflict of interest laws.176 One
transaction involved the Stanford Academic Institute of Learning Summer
Mathematics Initiative (SAIL), a privately operated summer program owned by
Chavis and a former board member.177 SAIL charged the charter schools $500 per
student. From the 2009–10 fiscal year through 2011, the charter schools paid SAIL
$355,000.178 FCMAT found that these students were required to attend SAIL, which
was in violation of state law.179 Additionally, students were fined fifty dollars per
day for each day that they missed. According to FCMAT, this charge was also a
violation of state law.180
The construction projects between the AIMS and companies owned by Chavis
constituted another form of illegal related-party transactions. FCMAT found that
AIMS schools paid Chavis’s companies more than $1.5 million for construction improvements.181 Many of these transactions occurred without formal contracts, competitive bidding, or authorization from the charter schools’ governing board. 182
4. Grand Traverse Academy
Steven Ingersoll, the founder of Michigan’s Grand Traverse Academy (GTA) also
used a related-party transaction scheme to enrich his coffers. GTA enrolls nearly
1300 students from pre-K to twelfth grade.183 At the start of every school year, GTA
prepaid a management fee to Ingersoll’s EMO, Smart Schools Management. 184
Because of concerns with GTA’s prepayment practices, the charter school’s authorizer requested that a new auditor review the charter school’s books. 185 In 2013,
the new auditor found that the charter school had advanced Ingersoll’s manage ment company more than $2.3 million in management fees. 186 That same year, an
attorney for GTA sent Ingersoll a demand letter claiming that he owed $3.5 million

175. FISCAL. CRISIS & MGMT. ASSISTANCE TEAM, supra note 172.
176. Id. at 11–28.
177. Id. at 15.
178. Id. at 16.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 24–26.
182. Id. at 25.
183. GRAND TRAVERSE ACAD., School Profile, ABOUT US, https://www.mygta.us/schoolprofile-1 [https://perma.cc/4UX6-UVQV].
184. Jennifer Dixon, Charter Founder Facing Trial on Bank Fraud Charges, DET. FREE
PRESS (Feb. 7, 2015, 11:03 PM), http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2015/02
/07/charter-schools-steven-ingersoll-grand-traverse-academy/23054725/
[https://perma.cc
/K2L2-W9Q8].
185. Id.
186. DENNIS, GARTLAND & NIEGARTH, GRAND TRAVERSE ACADEMY: FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS AND REPORT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS 21 (2013),
http://bridgemi.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/pdf1.pdf [https://perma.cc/WC85-4UNN].
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to the school.187 Ingersoll tried to repay the debt, but when he fell short by $1.6
million, the board forgave the remaining debt. 188
Ingersoll sought to repay GTA by taking out a $1.8 million line of credit that he
received from a local bank. Ingersoll claimed that he was using that money to convert a church to house another charter school that he had founded. 189 However, he
diverted $934,000 of this line of credit into his personal bank account, using some
of that money to repay the debt that he owed GTA. 190 In 2015, Ingersoll was convicted of federal tax evasion charges in relation to the church renovation scheme. 191
In 2016, he was sentenced to forty-one months in prison. 192
5. Pennsylvania Cyber Charter School
The scandal involving Pennsylvania Cyber Charter School (“PA Cyber”) shows
that unscrupulous related-party transactions can also occur in the virtual school
setting. Virtual schools “deliver all curriculum and instruction via the Internet and
electronic communication, usually with students at home and teachers at a remote
location, and usually with everyone participating at different times.” 193 Nicholas
Trombetta was the founder and former CEO of PA Cyber, which at its peak enrolled more than 11,000 students from across the state. 194
Trombetta also founded other companies that conducted business with PA
Cyber. One such entity was the National Network of Digital Schools (NNDS), an
EMO that provided curriculum and management services to the charter school. 195

187. Chastity Pratt Dawsey, Upcoming Fraud Trial for Charter School Operator Hangs
over Charter School Industry, MLIVE (Jan 8, 2015, 5:30 AM), http://www.mlive.com
/education/index.ssf/2015/01/upcoming_fraud_trial_for_schoo.html [https://perma.cc/ND4R66HS].
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Cole Waterman, Federal Jury Convicts Bay City Academy Founder Steven Ingersoll
of 3 of 6 Tax Fraud Charges, MLIVE (Mar. 20, 2015, 1:35 PM), http://www.mlive.com
/news/bay-city/index.ssf/2015/03/federal_jury_convicts_bay_city.html
[https://perma.cc
/344J-8XZJ].
192. Cole Waterman, Bay City Academy Founder Steven Ingersoll Gets 41 Months in
Federal Prison, MLIVE (Dec. 16, 2016, 8:29 AM), http://www.mlive.com/news/baycity/index.ssf/2016/12/bay_city_academy_founder_steve_1.html
[https://perma.cc/ZS6Y3SR5].
193. GARY MIRON, BRIAN HORVITZ & CHARISSE GULOSINO, NAT’L EDUC. POLICY CTR.,
VIRTUAL SCHOOLS IN THE U.S. 2013: POLITICS, PERFORMANCE, POLICY, AND RESEARCH
EVIDENCE 1 (2013), http://nepc.colorado.edu/files/nepc-virtual-2013-section-1-2.pdf [https://
perma.cc/F3N7-R4PK]; see also Joseph O. Oluwole & Preston C. Green III, Virtual Schools,
Student Rights, and the First Amendment: Adjusting the Schoolhouse Gate to the 21st Century,
17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 221 (2015) (discussing virtual schools).
194. Trombetta Pleads Guilty, MORNING J. (Aug. 25, 2016), http://www.morning
journalnews.com/news/local-news/2016/08/trombetta-pleads-guilty [https://perma.cc/4BCPH387]. The school presently educates more than 9000 students. Id.
195. Albert F. Moran, Comment, Keeping Them Honest: Proactively Preventing Fraud in
Pennsylvania’s Cyber Charter Schools, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 399, 412 (2014).
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An audit of PA Cyber performed by the state auditor general’s office revealed that
the charter school paid NNDS more than $153 million from 2011 to 2014, which
was almost half of the school’s annual expenditures. 196 The auditing office was
highly critical of the terms of the management services agreement between the
charter school and the EMO. Instead of using a cost-based fee formula, the agreement stipulated that NNDS would receive twelve percent of the charter school’s
revenues received from the state and enrolling school districts. 197 By not basing
payment on actual costs, the state auditor declared that the fee structure weakened
the level of accountability demanded of the EMO. 198
The audit also revealed that the most recent curriculum agreement between PA
Cyber and the EMO imposed financial penalties for failure to meet deadlines for the
delivery of the curriculum.199 Yet, when NNDS failed to meet three of four deadlines
established in the agreement, PA Cyber’s board waived the $4.2 million in penalties.200
In August 2016, Trombetta pleaded guilty to federal tax fraud charges. In his plea,
Trombetta admitted that he and others had transferred $8 million from PA Cyber to other
companies controlled by Trombetta, and filed false tax returns to make it seem as though
the conspirators received the money, when, in fact, the money went to Trombetta.201
C. The Federal Government, Related-Party Transactions, and the Need for Strong
Gatekeeping
One might be tempted to conclude that the examples provided in the prior subpart
are mere anecdotes, and that there is thus no cause for concern that unreasonable
related-party transactions are widespread. However, it is important to keep in mind
that two of the EMOs profiled in this subpart alone, Imagine Schools and PA Cyber,
educate a combined 42,000 students. Another industry giant, K12 Inc., has been accused of similar transgressions. This for-profit EMO is the largest operator of virtual
schools in the country. In 2010–11, K12 Inc. enrolled 65,000 students in forty-eight
virtual schools.202 An exposé of the California Virtual Academies, ten online schools
affiliated with K12 Inc.,203 found that the EMO “effectively controls the schools by
providing them with all academic services.”204 According to accounting experts who

196. PA. DEP’T OF THE AUDITOR GEN., PERFORMANCE AUDIT: PENNSYLVANIA CYBER
CHARTER SCHOOL 28 (2016), http://www.paauditor.gov/Media/Default/Reports/PACyber
CharterSchool,%20Beaver,%20092116.pdf [https://perma.cc/6FWB-2K3Z].
197. Id. at 29.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 35.
200. Id.
201. Trombetta Pleads Guilty, supra note 194.
202. GARY MIRON & JESSICA L. URSCHEL, NAT’L EDUC. P OLICY CTR., UNDERSTANDING
AND IMPROVING FULL-TIME V IRTUAL SCHOOLS: A STUDY OF SCHOOL C HARACTERISTICS,
SCHOOL FINANCE, AND SCHOOL PERFORMANCE IN SCHOOLS OPERATED BY K12 INC. 2 (2012),
http://nepc.colorado.edu/files/nepc-rb-k12-miron.pdf [https://perma.cc/TN5S-DG27].
203. CAL. VIRTUAL ACADS., WELCOME TO OUR SCHOOL! GRADES K–12, http://
cava.k12.com/ [https://perma.cc/87E5-VGNV].
204. Jessica Calefati, K12 Inc.: California Virtual Acadmies’ Operator Exploits Charter,
Charity Laws for Money, Records Show, MERCURY NEWS (Apr. 17, 2016, 10:48 PM),
http://www.mercurynews.com/2016/04/17/k12-inc-california-virtual-academies-operator-
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analyzed the management services agreements, it was “tough to tell where the nonprofit ends and where the company begins.” 205
The management services agreement between K12 Inc. and the California Virtual
Academy at San Mateo was especially troubling. The EMO was entitled to as much
as seventy-five percent of the charter school’s funding in exchange for its services.206
The rates for the EMO’s services routinely exceeded what the school could afford—
“by more than 25 percent.”207 While the academy’s application for nonprofit taxation
status claimed the agreement between the EMO and the school was the result of
“arm’s-length” negotiations, a review of the minutes of the governing board’s meetings revealed that an EMO employee led all of the meetings. 208 Further, the board
approved all resolutions promoted by the employee—after an average of only thirteen minutes of deliberation.209
In September 2016, the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of the Inspector
General (OIG), the agency’s watchdog, published the findings of an audit, which also
suggests that inappropriate related-party transactions are common in the charter
school sector.210 This audit, which assessed the risks posed by charter school EMOs
to the Department’s objectives, examined thirty-three charter schools from six states:
California, Florida, Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas.211 The OIG also
reviewed the Department’s monitoring and internal controls. 212 According to the
OIG audit, internal controls were essential because they were a “key component in
preventing fraud and detecting abuse.” 213
The OIG detected thirty-six instances of internal control weaknesses, which it
divided into three categories: (1) conflicts of interest; (2) insufficient segregation
of duties; and (3) related-party transactions.214 Thirteen of these thirty-six instances
involved related-party transactions.215 According to the OIG, these internal control
weaknesses posed considerable risks to the objectives of the Department in three
ways. First, these weaknesses increased the possibility of financial waste, fraud,

exploits-charter-charity-laws-for-money-records-show/ [https://perma.cc/SQJ8-85S9].
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., ED-OIG/ A02M0012,
NATIONWIDE ASSESSMENT OF CHARTER AND EDUCATION MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS
(2016),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oig/auditreports/fy2016/a02m0012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7424-66DP].
211. Id. at 5, 8. The Office of Inspector General referred to both EMOs and charter management organizations (CMOs) as CMOs. The OIG defined a CMO as “any organization
that operated or managed one or more charter schools, whether under contract or as charter
holders, without regard to the profit motive of the organization.” Id. at 1 n.1. EMOs, by
contrast, provide “whole school operation” services. Id. (internal quotations omitted). For
consistency purposes, we use the term EMO to refer to the entities described in the audit.
212. Id. at 1.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 2.
215. Id. at 40.
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and abuse.216 Second, by granting fiscal authority to EMOs, charter school governing boards increased the possibility that federal funds would not be used in accordance with federal laws, regulations, and grant requirements. 217 Third, by ceding
operational authority to EMOs, charter school governing boards increased the risk
that students would not receive services in line with federal program objectives. 218
In spite of these problems, the federal government has spent more than $4 billion since 1995 to encourage the growth of charter schools without emphasizing
oversight.219 In fact, one day before the OIG released its highly critical audit, the
Department announced that it had awarded $245 million to support high-quality
charter schools through its Charter Schools Program (CSP). 220
This continual emphasis on charter school growth by the federal government
without the attendant oversight might increase the occurrence of illegal related party transactions. A report co-authored by the Center for Popular Democracy and
the Alliance to Reclaim Our Public Schools has claimed to unearth $200 million
in charter school fraud, abuse, and mismanagement in fifteen states. 221 In another
report, these two groups claimed that California could lose $100 million to charter
school fraud in 2015.222 It stands to reason that there will be more transgressions
as the number of charter schools increase with insufficient oversight.
Additionally, federal policy might have the unintended effect of harming chil dren in low-income communities—the very students whom expanded choice options are supposed to benefit. Charter schools are frequently portrayed as a way to
improve the educational options for students attending schools in low-income and
minority neighborhoods.223 Charter schools have proven to be popular in low-income and minority communities. Indeed, “[m]ore than 80 percent of the students

216. Id. at 16.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Dustin Beilke, New Grants Announced: ED Continues To Pour Millions into
Charter School Black Hole, CTR. FOR MEDIA & DEMOC. PRWATCH (Sept. 29, 2016, 8:13
AM), http://www.prwatch.org/news/2016/09/13151/education-department-continues-pourmillions-tax-dollars-charter-school-blackhole [https://perma.cc/7PLW-F3U2].
220. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AWARDS $245 MILLION TO
SUPPORT HIGH-QUALITY P UBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.ed.gov
/news/press-releases/us-department-education-awards-245-million-support-high-qualitypublic-charter-schools [https://perma.cc/BPR2-T7F6].
221. CTR. FOR P OPULAR DEMOCRACY & ALL. TO RECLAIM OUR SCHS., THE TIP OF THE
ICEBERG: CHARTER SCHOOL VULNERABILITIES TO WASTE, FRAUD, AND ABUSE 1 (2015),
https://populardemocracy.org/sites/default/files/Charter-Schools-NationalReport_rev2.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NAN-VD6Z].
222. CTR. FOR P OPULAR DEMOCRACY , ACCE INST. & P UB. ADVOCATES INC., RISKING
P UBLIC MONEY: CALIFORNIA CHARTER SCHOOL FRAUD (2015), https://populardemocracy
.org/sites/default/files/Charter-Schools-California-Report-b.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TECZTVH].
223. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., ED-01-CO-0012, K–8 CHARTER SCHOOLS: CLOSING
THE ACHIEVEMENT GAP (2007), https://www2.ed.gov/admins/comm/choice/charterk8/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/FEL3-JZLJ]; Lew Moore, Charter Schools Can Benefit LowIncome Students, HERALDNET (Nov. 15, 2015, 5:03 PM), http://www.heraldnet.com
/opinion/charter-schools-can-benefit-low-income-students [https://perma.cc/8GF8-M4SA];
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in the top ten highest-enrollment share districts qualify for free or reduced priced
lunch, while 86 percent are from minority backgrounds.” 224 Thus, a federal policy
that emphasizes growth without oversight would likely disproportionately impact
charter schools in these communities.
In fact, this apprehension, inter alia, caused the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) to ratify a resolution “calling for a moratorium on charter school expansion and for the strengthening of oversight” in
October 2016.225 This resolution included several concerns about the impact of
fraud and mismanagement that charter schools posed for “low-income areas and
communities of color.”226 Because weak oversight puts “public funds at risk of
being wasted,” the NAACP resolved to seek legislation that would “strengthen the
investigative powers of those bodies that oversee charter school fraud, corruption,
[and] waste.” 227 Moreover, the civil rights organization further resolved to oppose
bills that “weaken[ed] the investigative powers of any legislative body from un covering charter school fraud, corruption, and/or waste.” 228
Because of the potential dangers posed by related-party transactions, strong
gatekeeping is vital. The next part examines the statutory and regulatory provisions
that apply to charter school gatekeepers to identify the tools they will need to meet
this challenge.
IV: CHARTER SCHOOL GATEKEEPERS
A. Auditors
Auditors serve as gatekeepers in the charter school sector as well as the financial
markets. States generally require charter schools to undergo annual financial audits
that comply with statutory or regulatory standards. 229 Table 1 identifies the entities
that are responsible for performing the annual audit on charter schools.

Facts on Public Charters, STAND FOR CHILDREN (2017), http://stand.org/evidenceon
charterschools [https://perma.cc/X5GV-5LFG]; Matt Vespa, In Denver, Charter Schools
Lead the Way in Helping Low-Income Students, TOWNHALL (Nov. 30, 2016, 6:30 PM),
http://townhall.com/tipsheet/mattvespa/2016/11/30/in-denver-charter-schools-lead-the-wayin-helping-lowincome-students-n2253001 [https://perma.cc/KN9E-SVX4].
224. NAT’L ALL. FOR P UB. CHARTER SCH., A GROWING MOVEMENT: AMERICA’S LARGEST
CHARTER SCHOOL COMMUNITIES (2015), http://www.publiccharters.org/wp-content/uploads
/2015/11/enrollmentshare_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/MYX3-XW3L].
225. NAT’L ASS’N FOR ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED P EOPLE, STATEMENT REGARDING THE
NAACP’S RESOLUTION ON A MORATORIUM ON CHARTER SCHOOLS (2016), http://www.naacp
.org/latest/statement-regarding-naacps-resolution-moratorium-charter-schools [https://perma
.cc/6KZA-MY8U].
226. Julian Vasquez Heilig, Breaking News: @NAACP Calls for National Moratoriums
on Charters, CLOAKING INEQUITY (July 29, 2016), https://cloakinginequity.com/2016
/07/29/breaking-news-naacp-calls-for-national-moratorium-on-charters
[https://perma.cc
/UX8N-T27Y].
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-6F-6(g)(5) (2017); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-23-505 (West
2017) (requiring audits to comply with generally accepted auditing principles); CAL. EDUC.
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Entity Performing Audit
Independent Auditor
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State

Alabama,230 Arizona,231 Arkansas,232
California,233 Colorado,234
Connecticut,235 Delaware,236 D.C.,237
Florida,238 Hawaii,239 Idaho,240
Illinois,241 Louisiana,242 Maine,243
Massachusetts,244 Michigan,245
Minnesota,246 Missouri,247 Nevada,248
New Hampshire,249 New Jersey,250
New York,251 North Carolina,252

CODE § 47605(b)(5)(I) (West 2017) (requiring audits to comply with generally accepted accounting principles); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-30.5-104(4)(a) (West 2017) (stating that
audits must comply with state department of education requirements); DC CODE § 381802.04 9(c)(11)(B)(ix) (2017) (stating that audits must comply with standards issued by
U.S. Comptroller General); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 302D-32 (West 2017) (requiring audits
to comply with standards set by authorizer and state department).
230. ALA. CODE § 16-6F-10(b)(4)(b) (2017).
231. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-914(D) (2017).
232. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-23-505 (West 2017).
233. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47605(b)(5)(I) (West 2017).
234. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-30.5-111.7(1)(a) (West 2017).
235. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-66qq (West 2017).
236. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 513(d)(1) (West 2017).
237. D.C. CODE § 38-1802.04 9(c)(11)(B)(ix) (2017).
238. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1022.33(9)(g)(4)(j)(1) (West 2017).
239. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 302D-32 (West 2017).
240. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-5205C(6) (West 2017).
241. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/27A-5(f) (West 2017).
242. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 29, pt. CXXXIX, § 2507(A) (2017).
243. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-a § 2412-A(3) (2017)
244. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 71, § 89(jj) (West 2017).
245. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.503(6)(g) (West 2017).
246. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 124E.16 (subdiv. 1)(d) (West 2017).
247. MO. CODE OF STATE REGS. tit. 5, § 20-100.250(4)(B)(1) (2017).
248. NEV. REV. STAT. § 388A.105(8)(a) (West 2017).
249. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 194–B:10(II) (2017).
250. N.J.STAT. ANN. § 18A:23–1 (West 2017).
251. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2851(2)(f) (McKinney 2017).
252. Every charter school in North Carolina is subject to audit requirements that are
established by the state department of education. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 115C-218.30(a)
(West 2017). The state department requires charter schools to contract with independent auditing firms to conduct annual audits. DIV. OF SCH. BUS., N.C. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION,
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Oklahoma,253 Oregon,254
Pennsylvania,255 South Carolina,256
Texas,257 Utah,258 Washington259
Independent Auditor or
Regulatory Agency

Georgia,260 Indiana,261 Iowa,262
Mississippi,263 New Mexico,264 Ohio,265
Tennessee266

FINANCIAL GUIDE FOR CHARTER SCHOOLS 24 (2017), http://www.ncpublicschools.org/docs
/fbs/finance/reporting/guides/charterschoolfinance.pdf [https://perma.cc/R8BT-SK2J].
253. Oklahoma charter schools are subject, to the extent possible, to the same financial
rules that apply to school districts. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 3-136(6) (West 2017). The
state’s public school audit statute provides that independent accounting firms must perform
audits for school districts. Id. § 22-104.
254. A charter school in Oregon (except for a charter school in a school district composed
of one school or a charter school that is a “remote and necessary school district”) must have
an annual audit prepared in accordance with the state municipal audit law. OR. REV. STAT. §
338.095(3) (West 2017). According to the municipal audit law, these audits and reviews must
be made by accountants in accordance with contracts agreed to by the governing body of the
charter school. These audits will look into accounting methods, the legality of transactions,
and compliance with requirement, orders, and regulations. Id. § 297.425.
255. 24 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2–218(a) (West 2017).
256. South Carolina’s charter school statute requires charter schools to comply with the
same auditing requirements as public schools. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59–40–50(B)(3) (2017). The
state’s administrative regulations provide that all public schools must undergo an audit by a
certified public accountant. S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 43-172(II) (2017).
257. 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 100.1047(c) (2017).
258. UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 277-113(C)(6) (2017).
259. A charter school in Washington must contract for an independent auditor after the
first year of school’s operation and every three years thereafter. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
28A.710.030(2) (West 2017).
260. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-2065(b)(7) (West 2017).
261. IND. CODE ANN. § 5-11-1-9(a) (West 2017).
262. Iowa charter schools are subject to the same financial audits, audit procedures, and audit
requirements as school districts. IOWA CODE ANN. § 256F.4(2)(f) (West 2017). Audits are
performed by either certified public accountants or the auditor of the state. Id. § 11.6(1)(a)(1).
263. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37–28–57(2) (West 2017).
264. Each charter school in New Mexico must have an annual audit that complies with the
state audit act and rules established by the state auditor. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-8-13.1(A) (West
2017). The Audit Act provides that agencies may be annually audited by “the state auditor,
personnel of the state auditor's office designated by the state auditor or independent auditors
approved by the state auditor.” Id. § 12-6-3(A).
265. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3314.50 (West 2017).
266. Tennessee charter schools are subject to state audit procedures and audit requirements.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-13-111 (West 2017). The charter school board must obtain an annual
audit of the charter school, which may be prepared by certified public accountants or the department of audit. Id. § 49-13-127(b)(1).
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Alaska,267 Kansas,268 Maryland,269
Rhode Island,270 Virginia,271
Wisconsin,272 Wyoming273

As Table 1 shows, in twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia, an independent auditor performs the annual audit. Seven states provide a choice between an
independent auditor or a regulatory agency, such as the state auditor’s office. Finally,
in seven states the entity performing the audit is not specified.
The five cases that we summarized in the prior part occurred in states that require
independent auditors to conduct annual audits: California (AIMS and Ivy
Academia);274 Michigan (GTA);275 Missouri (Imagine Schools);276 and Pennsylvania
(PA Cyber).277 We found scant evidence of the auditors’ detecting and questioning
the related-party transactions that we discussed. In three instances, the auditors’ failure might have been due to the fact that they were compromised, as was the case with
Enron’s firm, Arthur Andersen. In the case of the AIMS scandal, the founder’s wife
assisted with the annual audit through a private company that she owned. 278 With
respect to GTA, the initial accounting firm, which found nothing wrong with the
prepayments to Ingersoll’s EMO, represented both entities.279 In the case of PA
Cyber, the auditor general found that the charter school’s accounting firm was eventually “absorbed” by the EMO.280 These examples show that authorizers must take
great care to ensure that the auditors conducting the audit are truly independent.
These auditors might have also performed poorly because they failed to consider
the possibility that the charter school officials were deliberately using related-party
transactions to defraud their charter schools.281 Auditors of other charter schools with
business partnerships should address this possible shortcoming by examining these

267. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 14.03.255(c)(6) (West 2017).
268. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-1906 (c)(9) (West 2017).
269. MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 9-110(a)(2)(iv) (West 2017).
270. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-77.2-2(a)(15) (West 2017).
271. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-212.8(B)(26) (West 2017).
272. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.40 (1m)(b)(11) (West 2017).
273. WYO. RULES & REGS. EDUC. GEN. Ch. 32 § 16(a)(viii)(E)(I) (West 2017).
274. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47605(b)(5)(I) (West 2017).
275. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.503(6)(g) (West 2017).
276. MO. CODE OF STATE REGS. tit. 5, § 20-100.250(4)(B)(1) (2017).
277. 24 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2–218(a) (West 2017).
278. FISCAL CRISIS & MGMT. ASSISTANCE TEAM, supra note 172, at 26.
279. U.S. v. Ingersoll, No. 14-CR-20216 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 22, 2016), http://www.leagle
.com/decision/In%20FDCO%2020160922F83/U.S.%20v.%20INGERSOLL [https://perma
.cc/C4JG-AGYJ].
280. PA. DEP’T OF THE AUDITOR GEN., supra note 196, at 22.
281. AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTING, AU SECTION 316: CONSIDERATION OF
FRAUD IN A FINANCIAL STATEMENT AUDIT 1719, 1719 (Dec. 15, 2002), http://www.aicpa.org
/Research/Standards/AuditAttest/DownloadableDocuments/AU-00316.pdf [https://perma.cc
/JF6Z-KCWH] (discussing the importance of auditors “exercis[ing] professional skepticism
when considering the possibility that a material misstatement due to fraud could be present”).
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relationships to determine whether they are dangerous related-party transactions.282
This focus would be consistent with the two main standards used by auditors: generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) and generally accepted government auditing standards (GAGAS). Both standards require auditors to consider the possible
risks of fraud intrinsic to the entities that they are investigating.
GAAS refers to the standards, established by the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants (AICPA), that apply to the “ordinary audit of financial statements by the independent auditor.”283 Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No.
99 requires auditors to conduct “brainstorming” sessions to determine how a client
might be vulnerable to fraud.284 SAS No. 109 requires auditors to understand the
entity and its environment, evaluate the attendant risks of material misstatements,
and address significant risks that require special consideration. 285
Established by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), GAGAS sets
the standards for auditors of governmental entities.286 GAGAS requires auditors to
identify any “laws, regulations, contracts or grant agreements that are significant
within the context of the audit objectives.” 287 This consideration requires auditors to
design auditing procedures “to obtain reasonable assurance of detecting instances of
noncompliance.”288
Now that the OIG’s investigation has uncovered the pervasiveness of related-party
transactions in the charter school sector, auditors are on notice of the dangers posed by
these agreements and should adjust their auditing protocols accordingly. Because
financial statement auditors generally lack the training to look for fraud, accounting
firms should consider hiring forensic specialists as part of their auditing team.289
Furthermore, states should increase the capacity of state regulatory agencies to
conduct regular audits of charter schools because these entities might be better
equipped to detect proscribed behavior in the charter school sector than independent
auditing firms. Evidence supporting this assertion comes from Ohio, one of the states
that provide such a choice. The state Auditor’s Office used to audit all charter schools
in Ohio, but a decade ago, the state also hired accounting firms because of budget

282. See PUB. CO. ACCOUNT. OVERSIGHT BD., STANDING ADVISORY GROUP MEETING:
FINANCIAL FRAUD 14–15 (Sept. 8–9, 2004), https://pcaobus.org/News/Events/Documents
/09082004_SAGMeeting/Fraud.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7BH-YYQP] (detailing fraud risk factor questions associated with related-party transactions).
283. AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, AU SECTION 110: RESPONSIBILITIES AND
FUNCTIONS OF THE INDEPENDENT AUDITOR 1593, 1593 (Nov. 1972), http://www.aicpa.org
/Research/Standards/AuditAttest/DownloadableDocuments/AU-00110.pdf [https://perma.cc
/42D2-A6P8].
284. AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS., AU SECTION 316: supra note 281, at
1724.
285. AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, AU SECTION 314: UNDERSTANDING THE
ENTITY AND ITS ENVIRONMENT AND ASSESSING THE RISKS OF MATERIAL MISSTATEMENT 1667,
1673, 1691–94 (Dec. 15, 2006).
286. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GOVERNMENT AUDITING STANDARDS: 2011
REVISION (Dec. 2011), http://gao.gov/assets/590/587281.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ADZ-J4N2].
287. Id. at 140.
288. Id.
289. Gin Chong, Detecting Fraud: What Are Auditors’ Responsibilities?, 24 J. CORP.
ACCOUNT. & FIN. 47, 53 (2013).
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cuts and the dramatic increase in charter schools.290 A review of the more than 4200
audits conducted in 2014 found that private firms detected misspending in one of
every 200 audits. By contrast, the state Auditor’s Office found misspending in one
of every six audits.291
States might incorporate regulatory agencies into an auditing regime by requiring
them to conduct periodic audits of charter schools. For example, Delaware requires
charter school authorizers to conduct audits of their charter schools every three years
with the assistance of the state Department of Education.292 Regulatory agencies
might also conduct risk assessments of charter schools and subject those schools that
are vulnerable to fraud to further audits or investigations. The statutes and regulations
of three states impose such a requirement: Louisiana,293 New York,294 and Texas.295
Moreover, states should empower regulatory agencies to conduct discretionary
audits if they suspect that fraud has occurred in a charter school. Table 2 identifies
the entities that may perform these audits.
Table 2: State Regulatory Agencies That May Perform Discretionary Audits
Entity Performing Audit
State
State Auditor

Alabama,296 Arizona,297 Florida,298
Louisiana,299 Massachusetts,300

290. Doug Livingston, Charter Schools Misspend Millions of Ohio Tax Dollars as Efforts
To Police Them Are Privatized, AKRON BEACON J. (May 30, 2015), http://www.ohio.com
/news/local/charter-schools-misspend-millions-of-ohio-tax-dollars-as-efforts-to-police-themare-privatized-1.596318 [https://perma.cc/Z4DU-GEXK].
291. Id.
292. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 513(h) (West 2017).
293. Louisiana’s administrative code requires charter schools to be “evaluated using the
financial risk assessment and the financial indicators included in the charter school performance compact.” LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 29, pt. CXXXIX, § 1503(C)(1) (2017). The Louisiana
Department of Education further provides that it will use its “risk assessment process to identify specific charter schools for mandatory internal control procedures review.” LA. DEP’T OF
EDUC., LOUISIANA CHARTER SCHOOL FISCAL OVERSIGHT POLICY 3.
294. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 33(2) (McKinney 2017).
295. TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 19, § 109.25(c) (2017).
296. ALA. CODE § 16-13A-7(d) (2017).
297. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-239(D) (2017).
298. While we found no statutory or regulatory provision granting a state regulatory agency
the authority to perform audits, the Florida Office of Chief Auditor (OCA) has performed
audits of charter schools. See, e.g., FLA. OFFICE OF CHIEF AUDITOR, AUDIT OF THE OPERATIONS
OF THE SOUTH FLORIDA VIRTUAL CHARTER SCHOOL BOARD, INC. (2016), http://www.broward
.k12.fl.us/auditdept/auditcommittee/2015-16/2016-0121/ac-2016-0121-operations-southflvirtual-charter.pdf [https://perma.cc/3S87-8J57].
299. The Louisiana enabling statute requires charter schools to be subject to the financial
auditing requirements that are imposed by the audit statute. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:3996(F)
(2017). The financial audit statute empowers the legislative auditor to examine, audit and review the books and accounts of charter schools. LA. STAT. ANN. § 24:513(A)(1)(a) (2017).
300. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 71, § 89(jj) (West 2017).
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Minnesota,301 New York,302 North
Carolina,303 Oklahoma,304 Ohio,305
Pennsylvania,306 Tennessee,307
Washington308
SEA

Alaska,309 Arizona,310 Delaware,311
Iowa,312 Michigan,313 Minnesota,314
Oklahoma,315 Texas316

Special Agency

California317

No State Regulatory Agency

Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut,

Specified

DC, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maine,
Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, New
Jersey,318 New Hampshire, New

301. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 124E.16 (subdiv. 1)(a) (West 2017) (state or legislative auditor).
302. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2854(c) (McKinney 2017).
303. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 147-64.6(c)(2) (West 2017).
304. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 3-136(6) (West 2017).
305. In May 2015, the Ohio Auditor of State created the Public Integrity Assurance Team
(PIAT), which has the authority to investigate fraud in governmental entities. Press Release,
Ohio Audit. State, ANNUAL REPORT 2016 at 16 (2016), https://ohioauditor.gov/publications
/2016%20annual%20report.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8NH-JPZC]. A PIAT investigation of the
Directions Academy led to the conviction and sentencing of the charter school founder after it
discovered that the founder had misappropriated funds earmarked to start the school. OHIO
AUDITOR OF STATE, Charter School Operator Sent to Prison for Taking Funds Earmarked for
Start-up School (Nov. 28, 2016), https://ohioauditor.gov/news/pressreleases/Details/3305
[https://perma.cc/VW9X-SBAU].
306. 72 PA. STAT. ANN. § 403 (West 2017).
307. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-13-127(a) (West 2017).
308. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.710.030(2) (West 2017).
309. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § 33.115 (2017).
310. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-239(C) (2017).
311. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 513(d)(1) (West 2017).
312. Iowa charter schools are subject to the same financial audits, audit procedures, and
audit requirements as school districts. IOWA CODE ANN. § 256F.4(2)(f) (West 2017). Because
of this authorization, the state department of education may request a state audit when it is
apparent that such an audit should be made. Id. § 256.9(19).
313. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1281(2) (West 2017).
314. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 124E.16 (subdiv. 1)(a) (West 2017).
315. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 3-136(6) (West 2017).
316. 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 100.1029(a) (2017).
317. CAL. EDUC. CODE § § 42127.8 (West 2017).
318. The New Jersey administrative code stipulated that a charter school that had been
subject to an audit by the department’s Office of Fiscal Accountability and Compliance
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Mexico, Nevada, Oregon, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming
As Table 2 shows, eighteen states empower their state auditors to perform discretionary audits. Thirteen states grant this power to their state auditors. Eight states
give this authority to their SEAs, such as their departments or boards of education.
Three states grant discretionary auditing authority to charter school authorizers.
Three states permit either the state auditor or SEA to perform discretionary audits:
Arizona,319 Minnesota,320 and Oklahoma.321 We found no evidence of such authority
for twenty-six states and the District of Columbia.
Additionally, California has created a special agency with discretionary authority
to audit charter schools. The state’s FCMAT is a state agency that helps “local educational agencies fulfill their financial and management responsibilities.”322 Pursuant
to this responsibility, a county superintendent may request FCMAT to perform an
“extraordinary audit” if that individual “has reason to believe that fraud, misappropriation of funds, or other illegal fiscal practices have occurred that merit examination.”323
In New York, charter schools have twice successfully sued to prevent the legislature from subjecting them to discretionary audits by the state comptroller, which also
applied to the state’s traditional public schools. In each instance, the charter schools
prevailed by asserting that they were more private than the institutions that the state
constitution authorized the comptroller to audit.324 Charter school advocates claimed
that discretionary audits by governmental entities are redundant because charter
schools are also subject to annual independent audits— which we have shown is a
dubious assertion.325 The legislature responded to each decision by amending the
statute to fulfill state constitutional requirements. 326 At the present time, the city

(OPAC) had to discuss the findings of the audit at a public meeting of the charter school’s
board of trustees. The board also had to approve a corrective plan to address the findings.
However, this code provision expired on November 25, 2016. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:23A–
22.7 (West 2017).
319. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-239(D) (2017) (permitting a state auditor); id. § 15239(C) (permitting SEA).
320. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 124E.16 (subdiv. 1)(a) (West 2017).
321. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 3-136(6) (West 2017).
322. FISCAL CRISIS MGMT. & ASSISTANCE TEAM, supra note 173.
323. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 1241.5(b) (West 2017).
324. N.Y. Charter Sch. Ass’n v. DiNapoli, 991 N.E.2d 991 (N.Y. 2009) (finding that
charter schools were not political subdivisions); Success Acad. Charter Sch.—NYC v.
DiNapoli, No. 3708–13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 12, 2014) (finding that charter schools are neither
political subdivisions nor public corporations).
325. Rick Karlin, Judge Bars Comptroller Audit of Charter Schools, TIMES UNION (Mar.
14, 2014), http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Judge-bars-comptroller-audit-of-charterschools-5319373.php [https://perma.cc/8BQ2-7E3E.]
326. For a discussion of these cases, please see Preston C. Green, III & Joseph O. Oluwole,
An Analysis of the New York Charter School Auditing Cases, 319 ED. LAW REP. 1 (2014).
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comptroller has the authority to audit charter schools in New York City, while the
state comptroller may perform discretionary audits on the rest of the state’s charter
schools.327
B. Charter School Governing Boards
Charter school governing boards also serve as gatekeepers who have the responsibility of providing financial oversight over charter schools. In many states, these
boards are made up of private citizens.328 In all of the instances covered in the prior
part, charter school governing boards failed in their gatekeeping duty. In the case of
the PA Cyber scandal, conflicts of interest played a major role in the governing
board’s failure. The state auditor general’s audit revealed that the son of one board
member was the director of operations of PA Cyber’s EMO. 329 PA Cyber paid a
computer company owned by a third board member more than $1.1 million in one
year, but the governing board failed to disclose that member’s connection to the
company.330

327. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2854(c) (McKinney 2017). After the state legislature addressed the
constitutional issues raised in Success Academy Charter Schools—NYC, the city comptroller
announced that he would audit the plaintiff in that case, a network of thirty-two charter schools
serving 14,000 students in New York City. Geoff Decker, Success Academy Charter Schools
Among First To Be Audited by Comptroller, CHALKBEAT NEW YORK (Oct. 30, 2014); SUCCESS
ACAD. CHARTER SCHS., Who We Are, http://www.successacademies.org/about [https://
perma.cc/QVM9-CH42]. In December 2016, the city comptroller released the results of that
audit. SCOTT M. STRINGER, CITY OF NYC OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, AUDIT REPORT OF
SUCCESS CHARTER SCHOOL-NYC’S OVERSIGHT OF FINANCIAL OPERATIONS (2016), https://
comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/documents/FK15_092A.pdf [https://perma.cc/8276EBWH]. The audit found several questionable related-party transactions. Id. at 40–41. For
instance, the audit revealed that Success Academy had failed to document and obtain the
required approval for $2.7 million in loans from the EMO. Id. at 40. Success Academy stated
that these agreements had never existed in written form. Despite this lack of a written record,
the school’s governing board voted to approve these loans retroactively. Id.The audit also
revealed that the EMO had obtained three loan agreements from a private foundation totaling
$6.45 million, which the EMO, in turn, passed through to Success Academy. One of these
agreements between the EMO and the private foundation provided the potential for $1 million
in loan forgiveness. However, Success Academy provided no documentation assuring that the
EMO had passed on this favorable term to Success Academy. Id. at 41. Therefore, the EMO
had the potential of gaining revenue from the loan it had made to the corporation. Id. Success
Academy responded to the audit’s findings by proclaiming that its auditor BDO “is the fifthlargest accounting firm in the world and serves as the auditor of scores of Fortune 500
companies.” Id. at Addendum, p.2. Success Academy also defended itself by observing that
BDO had consistently given it “a clean bill of health with respect to its financial practices.”
Id. While we are not questioning BDO’s status as a first-rate auditor, its failure to identify the
related-party issues caught by the comptroller demonstrates the need for discretionary audits
by regulatory bodies.
328. Preston C. Green, III, Bruce D. Baker & Joseph O. Oluwole, Having it Both Ways:
How Charter Schools Try To Obtain Funding of Private Schools and the Autonomy of Private
Schools, 63 EMORY L.J. 303, 304 (2013).
329. PA. DEP’T OF THEAUDITOR GEN., PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra note 196, at 19.
330. Id. at 21.
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Auditor General Eugene DePasquale was highly critical of the various relatedparty deals that were uncovered in the audit. Because of the “various and assorted
deals and agreements,” he noted, “it leaves one to question who is benefiting, students or the adults making the deals.”331 DePasquale was further troubled that neither
the state’s charter school law nor its ethics statute prohibited governing board members from simultaneously serving as officers and board members of companies that
were providing services to PA Cyber. As he explained, “such situations provide an
appearance of a conflict of interest that should be mitigated.”332
We would go further than DePasquale and declare that the related-party deals uncovered by the audit were so severe that the conflicts of interests could not be “mitigated.” In fact, two states—Minnesota333 and New Mexico334—forbid persons from
serving on a governing board if they or their immediate family members own or have
a significant stake in any entity providing “professional services, goods, or facilities”
to the charter school.
In the case of Imagine Schools, the federal district court found that the governing
board was subservient to the EMO because the EMO recruited the board members
and then had the board sign an operating agreement that allocated all tax revenues
received by the board to the EMO.335 Indeed, the EMO obtained “pre-signed, undated
resignation letters from board members at the time they joined the a [sic] board so
that board members could be expelled at any time [they] asserted too much authority.”336
The charter school statutes and regulations of nine states address this predicament
by specifically requiring charter schools to be structurally independent from their
EMOs. These states are Colorado,337 Connecticut,338 Illinois,339 Indiana,340 Maine,341

331. Press Release, Pa. Dep’t Audit. Gen., Auditor General DePasquale Says Audits of PA
Cyber Charter School, Two Other Schools Reaffirm Need to Overhaul Charter School Law
(Sept. 22, 2016), http://www.paauditor.gov/press-releases/auditor-general-depasquale-saysaudits-of-pa-cyber-charter-school-two-other-schools-reaffirm-need-to-overhaul-charter-schoollaw [https://perma.cc/TA6T-62NF].
332. Id. The ethics statutes of other states may prohibit persons from membership on charter school governing boards if they or their immediate family members are serving on the
boards of entities that are providing services to the schools. Therefore, states should specifically require charter schools to comply with their states’ ethics statutes. Five states require
charter schools to comply with state ethics statutes: (1) Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. §
1022.33(9)(j)(4) (West 2017)); (2) Idaho (IDAHO STAT. § 33-5204(2)(c) (West 2017)); (3)
Massachusetts (603 MASS. CODE REGS. 1.06(2)(e) (West 2017)); (4) Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 388A.246(20) (West 2017)); and (5) New Jersey (N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:11–3.1(a) (West
2017)).
333. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 124E.07(subdiv. 3)(a) (West 2017).
334. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-8B-5.2(A) (West 2017).
335. Renaissance Acad. for Math & Sci. of Mo., No. 4:13-CV-00645-NKL, at 4.
336. Id.
337. COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-30.5-104(4)(b) (West 2017).
338. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-66tt(e) (West 2017).
339. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/27A-10.5(e) (West 2017).
340. IND. CODE ANN. § 20-24-3-2.5(4) (West 2017).
341. 05-071 ME. CODE R. Ch. 140, § 2(8) (West 2017).
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Michigan,342 Mississippi,343 Nevada,344 and Rhode Island.345 Further, these states
provide indicia for determining whether a charter school governing board is independent from its EMO:
The EMO must not select the members of the governing board; 346
The governing board must select, retain, and compensate the attorney and auditing firm representing the board;347
The governing board and the EMO must reach the terms of the service contract
through arms-length negotiations;348
The EMO must not have control over financial decisions; 349
The fees for services must be reasonable;350 and
Other agreements between the governing board and the EMO must align with
market rates and not change if the contract is terminated.351
Furthermore, charter school governing boards should receive training with
respect to their supervisory responsibilities. The Imagine Schools, AIMS, and Ivy
Academia instances reveal that their governing boards failed to grasp the extent of
their oversight responsibilities. For instance, one board member testified at trial
that he erroneously believed that “Imagine Schools had authority over the
Renaissance Board.”352 This testimony led the court to describe the member as
being “very confused” about his board duties. 353 Similarly, in the Ivy Academia
case, the trial court characterized the president of the board of directors in the
following manner: “[F]rankly, having him on the board of directors was like having
nobody on the board of directors.” 354 With respect to the AIMS charter schools,
FCMAT concluded that “[t]here was little evidence of responsible governance by
the board,”355 and “[t]he governing board has failed to maintain and exercise its
responsibilities, authority, and control.”356

342. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.507(1)(f) (West 2017).
343. 10-402 MISS. CODE R. § 1.12(D) (West 2017).
344. NEV. REV. STAT. § 388A.393(1)(a) (West 2017).
345. 21-2-58 R.I. CODE R. § C-7-1(c) (West 2017).
346. 05-071 ME. CODE R. Ch. 140, § 2(8)(A).
347. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-66tt(e); 05-071 ME. CODE R. Ch. 140, § 2(8)(B); 21-258 R.I. CODE R. § C-7-1(c).
348. IND. CODE ANN. § 20-24-3-2.5(4); 05-071 ME. CODE R. Ch. 140, § 2(8)(C); 10-402
MISS. CODE R. § 1.12(D)(1).
349. NEV. REV. STAT. § 388A.393(1)(a).
350. 05-071 ME. CODE R. Ch. 140, § 2(8)(D).
351. Id. at § 2(8)(E).
352. Renaissance Acad. for Math & Sci. of Mo., No. 4:13-CV-00645-NKL, at 3.
353. Id. at 4.
354. Brief for Respondent at 34, People v. Selivanov, 210 Cal. Rptr. 3d 117 (Ct. App.
2016) (No. B252894), http://www.ccsa.org/2015-04-29-Selivanov-People_Respondent’s
_Brief_Embezzlement.pdf [https://perma.cc/GS8X-JPAE].
355. FISCAL CRISIS & MGMT. ASSISTANCE TEAM., supra note 172, at 34.
356. Id.
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Thirteen states require governing boards to receive training: Colorado, 357
Delaware,358 Florida,359 Georgia,360 Massachusetts, 361 Minnesota,362 Mississippi, 363
Nevada,364 New Jersey, 365 New Mexico,366 Tennessee,367 Texas,368 and
Wisconsin.369 Five of these states—Delaware, Florida, Minnesota, New Mexico,
and Texas—specifically include coverage of financial management in their
training provisions. In addition to training requirements, states should require
governing boards to possess expertise in financial management. Only three
states—Hawaii, 370 Louisiana,371 and South Carolina372—impose this requirement
on their charter school governing boards.
Finally, the examples of related-party transactions in Part III.B of this Article
show that governing boards should receive guidance regarding leasing
arrangements. In the Imagine Schools and Ivy Academia cases, the governing
boards approved leases that were egregiously disadvantageous to the charter
schools they represented. Maine and New Jersey have administrative code
provisions that cover charter school leases. Maine’s administrative code provides
that “loans or leases between the charter school and the education service provider
[must be] fair and reasonable, documented appropriately, align with market rates,
and include terms that [they] will not change if the contract is terminated.” 373 New
Jersey’s administrative code cautions that governing boards should ensure that
leases: (1) “[do] not exceed the length of the charter”; 374 (2) “contain[] a provision
terminating the obligation to pay rent upon the denial, revocation, non-renewal, or
surrender of the charter”; 375 and (3) “[do] not contain a provision accelerating the
obligation to pay rent in the event of default.” 376

357. 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 301-88:2.01(C) (West 2017).
358. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 1803 (West 2017).
359. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1022.33(9)(j)(4) (West 2017).
360. GA. CODE ANN., § 20-2-2084(f) (West 2017).
361. 603 MASS. CODE REGS. 1.06 (2017).
362. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 124E.07(Subdiv. 7) (West 2017).
363. 10-402 MISS. CODE REGS. § 2.5 (West 2017).
364. NEV. REV. STAT. § 388A.246(20) (West 2017).
365. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:32–3.2(a)(2) (West 2017).
366. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-8B-5.1 (West 2017).
367. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-13-111(o) (West 2017).
368. TEX. EDUC. CODE § 12.123 (West 2017).
369. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.40 (2r)(2)(j) (West 2017); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.40 (2x)(2)(j)
(West 2017).
370. HAW. REV. STAT. § 302D-12(b)(3) (West 2017).
371. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 28, pt. CXXXIX, § 2101(D)(2) (2017).
372. S.C. STAT. § 59-40-50(B)(9) (2017).
373. 05-071 ME. CODE R. Ch. 140, § 2(8)(E) (West 2017).
374. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:23A–22.4(b)(1) (West 2017).
375. Id. § (b)(2).
376. Id. § (b)(3).
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C. Charter School Authorizers
Charter school authorizers review applications to determine whether to grant charters, monitor the schools for which they are responsible, and decide whether to revoke or renew charters. 377 Charter school authorizers are “ultimately responsible for
the fiscal oversight of each charter school they oversee.” 378 Their duty to ensure the
fiscal health of charter schools extends “from application approval to oversight and
monitoring to closure or renewal.”379
Consequently, authorizers play a pivotal role in guarding against unreasonable
related-party transactions. Authorizers can better fulfill this task by reviewing all
major charter school agreements including service contracts with EMOs, leasing
agreements, and vending contracts. Perhaps such a review might have prevented the
charter school governing boards from entering into the disastrous agreements discussed in the third part of this Article.
Five states partially address this suggestion by specifically requiring authorizers
to review the service agreements between EMOs and charter schools: Colorado,
Connecticut, Illinois, Michigan, and New Mexico. Michigan’s charter school statute
provides that an authorizer “must review and may disapprove any agreement between the board of directors . . . and an educational management organization before
the agreement is final and valid.”380 New Mexico provides that the authorizer must
review contracts with a “third-party provider” and assess the charter school’s financial independence from the provider.381 Colorado and Illinois require authorizers to
enforce the following requirements for “any school contracting with a third-party
provider for educational design and operation or management”: (1) including contractual provisions that affirm the rigorous independence of the governing board’s
oversight authority; (2) adding provisions that ensure that the school and the external
provider are financially independent from each other; and (3) reviewing the proposed
contract “as a condition of charter approval to ensure that it is consistent with applicable law, authorizer policy and the public interest.” 382
Connecticut’s charter school statute requires the state board of education, which
is the state’s authorizer, to review and approve “any contract for whole school management services” before the contract takes effect. 383 As part of the review, the authorizer must “solicit and review comments . . . from the local or regional board of

377. Sandra Vergari, Charter School Authorizers: Public Agents for Holding Charter
Schools Accountable, 33 EDUC. & URB. SOC. 129, 132 (2001).
378. NAT’L CHARTER SCH. RES. CTR., A USER’S GUIDE TO FISCAL OVERSIGHT: A TOOLKIT
FOR CHARTER SCHOOL AUTHORIZERS 2 (2016), https://www.charterschoolcenter.org/sites
/default/files/Fiscal%20Oversight%20Toolkit%20-%20Authorizers%20(1).pdf [https://perma
.cc/6EZ9-T5ZD].
379. Id.
380. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.503(n) (West 2017).
381. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-8B-9(B)(14) (West 2017).
382. 1 COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 301-88:3.04(D)(1), (D)(2) (West 2017); ILL. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 23, § 650 App. A (West 2017).
383. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-66tt(c) (West 2017).
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education of the town in which the charter school is located or in which the proposed
charter school is to be located.”384
While we laud these states for requiring authorizers to review service agreements
with EMOs, we suggest that even these states can improve their provisions by including lease agreements and vending contracts. As the related-party transaction examples provided in the third part of this Article make clear, the categories “education
design and operation” or “whole management services” are not the only contracts
that can be against the “public interest.”
States can also receive guidance from national authorizing entities, such as the
National Association of Charter School Authorizers (NACSA), in developing approaches for reviewing related-party transactions. NACSA has published a guide titled, Principles and Standards for Quality Authorizing, which provides advice for
contracts with EMOs.385 This publication advises authorizers to require that such
contracts include mandatory authorizer review and approval as a prerequisite for
granting charters. The publication also suggests that education service or management agreements articulate “[a]ll compensation to be paid to the provider, including
all fees [and] bonuses”386 as well as the “[t]erms of any facility agreement that may
be part of the relationship.”387
Eleven states require authorizers to adopt national standards for charter school
oversight and evaluation: Alabama,388 Colorado,389 Illinois,390 Louisiana, 391
Maine,392 Mississippi,393 Nevada,394 South Carolina,395 Tennessee,396 Washington, 397
and Wisconsin.398 While Colorado and Illinois’ contractual review provisions, discussed earlier in this subpart, are direct quotes from the NACSA’s Principals and
Standards publication,399 the statutes and regulations of the remaining states provide
no elaboration about contract review. We hope that these states—and others—also
adopt the contractual review guidance provided by national authorizer entities, taking
special care to include authorizer review of vending contracts that do not fall under
the category of agreements for comprehensive services or management.

384. Id.
385. NAT’L ASS’N OF CHARTER SCH. AUTHORIZERS, PRINCIPLES & STANDARDS FOR
QUALITY CHARTER SCHOOL AUTHORIZING (2015 ed.), http://www.qualitycharters.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/08/Principles-and-Standards_2015-Edition.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZGF8TGTT].
386. Id. at 24.
387. Id.
388. ALA. CODE § 16-6F-6(r) (2017).
389. 1 COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 301-88:3.02(B)(2), 302(C)(1) (West 2017).
390. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 23, § 650 App. A (West 2017).
391. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:3981(4) (2017).
392. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-a, § 2405(3) (2017).
393. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-28-9(1)(a) (West 2017).
394. NEV. REV. STAT. § 388A.223(2) (West 2017).
395. S.C. STAT. ANN. § 59-40-55(A) (2017).
396. TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 0520-14-01-.02(6) (2017).
397. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.710.100(3) (West 2017)
398. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.40(3m)(b) (West 2017).
399. NAT’L ASS’N OF CHARTER SCH. AUTHORIZERS, supra note 385, at 16.
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D. State Education Agencies (SEAs)
SEAs are charged with supervising a state’s public elementary and secondary
schools.400 This duty encompasses “the administration of state and federal funding
programs.”401 SEAs fulfill this responsibility “through four key activities: regulation,
funding, compliance monitoring, and technical assistance.”402
The OIG’s audit found that the SEAs’ monitoring of charter schools’ relationships
with EMO was inadequate. In particular, none of the participating SEAs included
procedures for identifying internal control weaknesses, including related-party transactions.403 The audit also found no legislation that required the participating SEAs to
provide oversight over their authorizers.404 This lack of oversight might enable illegal
related-party transactions to endure without detection. In our review of charter school
laws, we found that Alabama405 and Washington406 require their SEAs to monitor
charter school authorizers. Seven states—Hawaii,407 Illinois,408 Indiana,409 Maine, 410
Minnesota,411 Missouri,412 and Ohio413—go further still by granting SEAs the power
to revoke authorizing authority due to poor performance. Obviously, other jurisdictions should also grant SEAs the authority to monitor and revoke the performance of
their authorizers.
In addition to the findings of the OIG audit, we recommend that SEAs coordinate
with their authorizers regarding their responsibilities for investigating instances of
fraud and mismanagement. The GTA example shows how authorizers and other governmental entities can fail to work together to detect unlawful activity. After the authorizer informed the Michigan Department of Education about the improper prepayments, Michael Flanagan, who was then the state superintendent of public
instruction, responded in a letter agreeing that these payments might have placed the
charter school at financial risk.414 Nevertheless, Flanagan opined that the department
had “no statutory authority to recommend any corrective actions.” 415 Flanagan also
advised the governing board to take a series of steps, including conducting “at its

400. 34 C.F.R. § 77.1 (2017).
401. JOANNE WEISS & PATRICK MCGUINN, THE EVOLVING ROLE OF THE STATE EDUCATION
AGENCY IN THE ERA OF ESSA: PAST, PRESENT AND UNCERTAIN FUTURE 32 (2017),
http://www.aspendrl.org/portal/browse/DocumentDetail?documentId=2958&download&ad
min=2958%7C1917288972 [https://perma.cc/WJV7-QF7R].
402. Id.
403. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 210, at 25.
404. Id. at 27.
405. ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 290-3-6-.03(1) (2017).
406. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 180-19-220(1) (2017).
407. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 302D-11 (West 2017).
408. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 23, § 650.65 (2017).
409. IND. CODE ANN. § 20-24-2.2-6 (West Supp. 2017).
410. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-a, § 2403(5) (2017).
411. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 124.05 (subdiv. 6) (West 2017).
412. MO. ANN. STAT. § 160.400(17)(2) (West Supp. 2017).
413. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3314.015(C) (West 2017).
414. Letter from Michael P. Flanagan, State Superintendent of Pub. Instruction, to Dr.
Tony McLain, Pres., Lake Superior State Univ. (May 7, 2014) (on file with authors).
415. Id.
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own expense, . . . a forensic audit to determine what, if any, school assets have been
misused or misspent.”416
As it turns out, however, Flanagan’s claim that the state department of education
had no statutory authority to recommend corrective actions was incorrect. Section
380.1281 of the state’s education code specifically empowers the state board of education to “examine and audit the official records and accounts” of charter schools,
and “compel proper accounting by legal action instituted by direction of the attorney
general.”417 Another provision of the education code transfers the statutory rulemaking and administrative powers and duties of the state board to the superintendent of
public instruction for certain provisions, including section 380.1281, the provision
pertinent to this case.418 To protect against illegal related-party transactions, other
SEAs must do a better job than the Michigan Department of Education of delineating
their investigative responsibilities.
E. U.S. Department of Education
The U.S. Department of Education is the federal agency that helps the President
execute his educational policies and implement congressional legislation.419 The
Department is also responsible for establishing policy for, administering, and coordinating federal assistance to education. 420 The Department has provided funding
incentives to states to support the agency’s initiatives. 421 As we have noted in the
third part of this Article, the Department has used funding incentives for more than
two decades to encourage charter school growth without promoting oversight. This
Article has also explained that insufficient gatekeeping might permit bad actors to
use related-party transactions to defraud federal and state governments.
The OIG observed that the Department committed a critical mistake by treating
charter schools with EMOs the same as other grantees. Department officials defended this oversight by asserting that the “risks posed by charter schools and
[EMOs] were not materially different from the risks presented by other grantees
that received Department funds.” 422 Consequently, the Department’s risk model

416. Id.
417. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1281(2) (West 2017). In 1994, the state legislature
amended § 380.1281(2) to include charter schools. 1994 Mich. Legis. Serv. P.A. 416 (West).
418. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 388.994(1)–(2) (West 2017). These provisions transferred certain administrative powers and duties from the state board of education to the superintendent of public instruction. Specifically, the legislature ordered a Type II transfer, which
granted the superintendent all of the board’s “statutory authority, powers, duties and functions.” MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 16.103(3)(b) (West 2017).
419. An Overview of the U.S. Department of Education, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Sept. 2010),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/focus/what_pg2.html [https://perma.cc/N5RV-QB88].
420. Id.
421. See Eloise Pasachoff, Conditional Spending After NFIB v. Sebelius: The Example of
Federal Education Law, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 577 (2013).
422. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 210, at 23.
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failed to include “criteria indicative of the risks unique to charter school relationships with [EMOs].”423 Notably, department officials failed to assess the risks connected with charter school EMO governance structures because they believed that
“issues concerning the direct governance of charter schools are primarily the responsibility of the appropriate State and local governments, including charter
school authorizers.”424
The OIG’s critique is reminiscent of John Kroger’s disparagement of the SEC’s
oversight of Enron. According to Kroger, the SEC failed to consider the risks that
Fortune 500 companies posed to the financial markets. 425 Similarly, the OIG
faulted the Department for not taking into account the threat posed by the “unique
attributes” of charter school EMO relationships. 426 In particular, the Department
failed to consider how dramatically the charter school governance structure departs
from that of traditional public schools. School districts rarely hire EMOs to run the
day-to-day operations of traditional public schools. 427 By contrast, EMOs manage
thirty-five to forty percent of all charter schools.428
We have explained elsewhere how the hiring of EMOs creates an agency issue
with charter school governing boards that generally does not occur in traditional
public schools.429 While governing boards have the incentive to ensure that their
schools are operating in a fiscally sound manner, EMOs have the incentive to increase their revenues or cut expenses in ways that may go against the goals of the
governing boards.430 EMOs have taken advantage of poorly trained governing
boards and the lack of coordination between governing boards and authorizing
bodies to benefit their interests at the expense of charter schools. 431 Therefore, it is
imperative for the Department to ensure that the regulatory system of grantees is
sufficiently robust to protect against this agency problem.
The OIG’s audit also provided recommendations that might help the
Department mitigate the risks posed by related-party transactions. Specifically, the
audit advised the Department to convene an oversight group that would develop
strategies for helping state gatekeepers reduce the risks posed by charter school

423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Kroger, supra note 2, at 108.
426. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 210, at 21.
427. In 2011–12, 94.6% of schools managed by EMOs were charter schools. Nearly
ninety-five percent of schools managed by nonprofit EMOs were charter schools. GARY
MIRON & CHARISSE GULOSINO, NAT’L EDUC. POLICY CTR., PROFILES OF FOR-PROFIT AND
NONPROFIT EDUCATION MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS iii–iv (14th ed. 2013),
http://nepc.colorado.edu/files/emo-profiles-11-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/9AB4-SGHN].
428. BAKER & MIRON, supra note 116, at 7.
429. Preston C. Green, III, Bruce D. Baker, Josephe O. Oluwole & Julie F. Mead, Are We
Heading Toward a Charter School “Bubble”?: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage Crisis,
50 U. RICH. L. REV. 783, 796–99 (2016).
430. Id. We suggested that the agency problem exists for only for-profit EMOs. Id. In this
Article, we assert that the agency problem also exists for nonprofit EMOs. See discussion
supra Part III.B.1 and accompanying notes.
431. Green et al., supra note 429, at 798–99.
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relationships with EMOs. 432 The group would take the following actions: (1) provide guidance to SEAs that helps them monitor and assess risk, as well as develop
mitigation procedures; (2) modify the protocols for monitoring federal grants; (3)
work with external parties to help SEAs and authorizers more effectively evaluate
applications; and (4) collaborate with other federal agencies to update the OMB
Circular A-133 Compliance Supplement, the document used to audit federal grant
programs and their recipients.433 The Department generally agreed with these recommendations.434 We also agree, only advising that the OIG extend its recommendations to other related-party transactions that might have a negative impact on the
Department’s programs.
Furthermore, the Department should use its funding incentives to encourage
greater oversight over charter schools. Now that the Department is aware of the
fraud and mismanagement that exists in this sector, it would be nonsensical to continue funding charter schools without requiring states to implement strategies to
protect against fraud as a requirement for funding. Otherwise, unscrupulous charter
school operators will continue to pose a threat to the Department’s goals.
The election of Donald J. Trump as President has placed the Department’s new
focus on related-party transactions in jeopardy. While on the campaign trail, Trump
proposed a $20 billion federal block grant to increase school choice options for 11
million students living in poverty. 435 Trump has also nominated Michigan
philanthropist Betsy DeVos to be the new Secretary of Education. 436 DeVos, who
played a role in the passage of Michigan’s charter school law, fought against
attempts to increase regulation of the state’s charter school sector. 437 For example,
when the Michigan legislature considered increasing oversight over Detroit’s
charter schools, the DeVos family donated $1.45 million over a seven week period
to the state’s Republican candidates and organizations. 438 The final legislation did
not include oversight provisions. 439

432. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 204, at 29.
433. Id. at 30–31.
434. Id. at 31.
435. COREY TURNER & ERIC WESTERVELT, Donald Trump’s Plan for America’s Schools
(Sept. 25, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2016/09/25/494740056/donald-trumpsplan-for-americas-schools [https://perma.cc/9F7H-A6G9].
436. Emma Brown, Trump Picks Billionaire Betsy DeVos, School Voucher Advocate, as
Education Secretary, WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/
education/trump-picks-billionaire-betsy-devos-school-voucher-advocate-as-education-secretary
/2016/11/23/c3d66b94-af96-11e6-840f-e3ebab6bcdd3_story.html?utm_term=.caf3961799c6
[https://perma.cc/E7L7-CBBT].
437. Philissa Cramer, What You Should Know About Betsy DeVos, Trump’s Education
Secretary Pick –and What Her Choice Might Tell Us About His Plans, CHALKBEAT (Nov. 22,
2016), http://www.chalkbeat.org/posts/us/2016/11/22/what-a-betsy-devos-appointment-wouldtell-us-about-donald-trumps-education-plans/ [https://perma.cc/ST95-U5BS].
438. Id.
439. Id.
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CONCLUSION
This Article has explained that: (1) Enron-like related-party transactions are common in the charter school sector; and (2) gatekeepers must be equipped to guard
against this type of destructive activity. We reviewed the following gatekeepers in
the charter school sector: auditors, governing boards, authorizers, SEAs, and the U.S.
Department of Education.
We have found that independent auditors must make detecting illegitimate related-party transactions a priority. States should also increase the capacity of regulatory bodies to conduct audits of charter schools. For instance, states could either: (1)
have regulatory agencies conduct periodic audits of all charter schools; or (2) conduct
risk assessments of charter schools and audit those schools most vulnerable to fraud.
Finally, states should authorize regulatory bodies to conduct discretionary audits if
they suspect that a charter school operator is engaging in fraud.
With respect to charter school governing boards, we recommend that states should
do the following: (1) forbid persons from serving on charter school boards if they or
their immediate family members have a significant financial stake in a contractor or
vendor; (2) require governing boards to be structurally independent from their
EMOs; (3) require board members to receive training regarding their supervisory
responsibilities; and (4) require governing boards to receive specific training regarding leases.
With respect to charter school authorizers, we advise that states require them to
review all vending and lease contracts and reject those that would be harmful to the
charter schools’ interests. Furthermore, states should: (1) require SEAs to monitor
the relationships between charter schools and their contractors; and (2) coordinate
with authorizers with respect to conducting investigations of suspected illegal
activities.
Finally, we advise the U.S. Department of Education to do the following: (1) develop risk assessments that account for risks posed by charter school-EMO relationships; (2) develop strategies that would enable state gatekeepers to reduce the risks
posed by related-party transactions; and (3) require states to implement fraud prevention programs as a prerequisite for the receipt of charter school funding.
Implementing these strategies should go a long way toward protecting charter
schools from the dangers posed by related-party transactions. They will strengthen
the ability of gatekeepers to ensure that state and federal funding is focused on the
education of students.
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